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TOWARDS A NEW EQUAL PROTECTION:
TWO KINDS OF EQUALITY
Maureen B. Cavanaugh*
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Let no one who is ignorant of geometry enter this place
Let no one who is unjust enter
For equality and justice are geometry
Introduction
The nomination and subsequent Senate confirmation hearings
of the newest Supreme Court Justice, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
recently focused attention once again on the Supreme Court's deci-
sions dealing with challenges to gender-based classifications under
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 2 Justice
Ginsburg's pivotal role in these cases,3 which have defined how gen-
* J.D., University of Minnesota, expected 1995; Ph.D., in Classics, Cornell Uni-
versity, 1980; James Rignall Wheeler Fellow at the American School of Classical
Studies at Athens, 1978-1979; B.A., Swarthmore College. Ms. Cavanaugh is the au-
thor of ELEusis AND ATHENS: DocumENrs IN FINANCE, POLITICS AND RELIGION IN THE
SECOND HALF OF THE FIFrH CENTURY, B.C. (forthcoming, Atlanta: American Philo-
logical Association, Classical Studies Series).
1. Inscription over the door of Plato's Academy, recorded by Tzetzes, the 12th
century A.D. grammarian. Hist.var.chileades 8, 972-75 quoted in F.D. Harvey, Two
Kinds of Equality, 26 CLAssICA ET MEDIAEVALIA 101, 126 (1965).
2. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the ju-
risdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Decisions for which Justice Ginsburg submitted briefs (for Appellants, Appel-
lee, Petitioners) include Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), Struck v. Secretary of
Defense, cert. granted, 409 U.S. 947,judgement vacated, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972); Fron-
tiero v. Richardson 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Edwards v. Healy, 421 U.S. 772 (1975);
Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975); Califano v. Gold-
farb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). Justice Ginsburg
submitted amicus briefs in the following cases: Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); Cleveland Board of Educa-
tion v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188
(1974); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wet-
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der-based classifications are now treated, is not the only reason for
renewed interest. Rather, as Justice Ginsburg herself remarked,
the question of whether gender is a suspect classification remains
because the Court has not yet answered it definitively, or
negatively. 4
This article will first review the Court's ad hoc, and hence
variable, analysis as applied to equal protection challenges to gen-
der-based discrimination to illustrate that the Court has failed to
articulate a coherent and satisfactory approach to this important
area of constitutional law. The arguments for recognition of gender
as a suspect class, raised in Justice Ginsburg's briefs and writings,
and elsewhere, will then be considered.5 More than simply review-
ing the inadequacies of past decisions, this article will demonstrate
that equal protection analysis must be undertaken de novo 6 be-
cause of its importance as the means by which the Court considers
challenges to classifications which impede full and equal opportu-
nity to participate in organized society.7
The need for a new approach to equal protection analysis
arises, in part, because of the inherent conflict between those now
considered citizens of the United States and the very limited class
zel,judgment vacated, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1971); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434
U.S. 136 (1977); University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Los
Angeles, Dep't. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Wengler v. Druggists Mu-
tual Insurance Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadel-
phia, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
4. Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, FEDERATED NEWS SERVICE, July
20, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, where Justice Ginsburg cited Missis-
sippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1981).
5. In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 367 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring), Justice Ginsburg again noted that it remains an open question whether
gender classifications are inherently suspect. Similarly, the question of whether, or
why, gender should be treated differently than race or ethnic status has been left
unanswered. She also stated that the appropriate standard for judging whether a
hostile work environment so altered working conditions as to "make it more difficult
to do the job" was the same for race-based as gender-based discrimination. Id. at
372-73.
6. While a superficial reading of the cases to be outlined in detail below might
suggest that the Court has actually formulated a clear and consistent approach to
Equal Protection cases, a closer examination of the material will reveal internal in-
consistences of such magnitude as to preclude their reconciliation. Moreover, the
end result reached (gender not suspect, occasional "remedial" measures upheld; race
suspect, no affirmative action permitted) is an unsatisfactory answer to the problems
of a diverse society, struggling to allow participation of a greater number of citizens
while laboring under the long and unfortunate history of discrimination against both
women and racial minorities.
7. Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HA v. L. REV. 1 (1977).
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to whom the term "citizenship" originallyS could be properly ap-
plied.9 If there is to be any substance to the promise offered in the
U.S. Constitution,' 0 more complete participation must be allowed
to those previously excluded. As Justice Ginsburg noted," "[w]e
still have, cherish, and live under our eighteenth century Constitu-
tion because, through a combination of three factors or forces -
change in society's practices, constitutional amendment, and judi-
cial intervention - a broadened system of participatory democracy
has evolved, one in which we take just pride." 12
An expansive reading of the Constitution, however, alone will
not suffice.IS Rather it is time to re-examine the very idea of what
equality is promised in the Fourteenth Amendment and the Ameri-
can Constitution. It is important to remember that the basic idea of
democracy, which took hold in colonial America, was synonymous
with the idea of equal opportunity.14 Moreover, Thomas Jefferson's
election in 1800 was due, in no small part, to the appeal of Jefferso-
nian democracy, characterized by its faith in entrusting govern-
ment to the people and by expressions of equal rights.15
8. "As framed in 1787, the Constitution was a document of governance for and
by white, propertied adult males .... " Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women
Becoming Part of the Constitution, 6 LAW & INEQ. J. 17 (1988) [hereinafter Ginsburg,
Remarks]. Clearly women were not included. It is worth remembering here the
often quoted reply by John Adams to Abigail Adams' plea "to remember the ladies"
in the course of founding the United States: "We know better than to repeal our
Masculine systems." 1 ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 370, 382 (L. Butterfield ed.,
1963)(original manuscript dated 1776) quoted in Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflec-
tions on Sex Equality Under Law, in WOMEN & THE LAw 15-A-2 (Carol H. Lefcourt
ed., 1993). See MacKinnon, supra, for more examples of women's "no special inter-
est" to 18th and 19th century writers.
9. This is equally true for the time of the Constitution's, and the Fourteenth
Amendment's, adoption.
10. I will argue below, chiefly based on Karst, supra note 7, that the Fourteenth
Amendment contains a substantive promise of equal protection of the laws which
should be understood to mean equal opportunity for participation by all citizens as
respected and valued members of society. See infra notes 184-88 and accompanying
text.
11. Ginsburg, Remarks, supra note 8, at 17.
12. Similarly, at her confirmation hearings Judge Ginsburg remarked: "I think
rank discrimination against anyone is against the tradition of the United States and
is to be deplored. Rank discrimination is not part of our culture. Tolerance is. And a
generous respect for difference based on ... diversity." Excerpts from Senate hear-
ings on Ginsburg Supreme Court Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1993, at A16.
13. An "expansive" reading of the Constitution is inadequate not only because it
depends too heavily on the whims of individual jurists and their own philosophy but
also because it suggests that the Constitution itself does not provide the basis for
such interpretation. Rather it suggests that the expansive reading is imported into
the document by the jurist, clearly a less credible basis for any decision.
14. ALLAN NEVINS & HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, A POCKET HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 48 (1970).
15. In Jefferson's words (from his inaugural address) the "sacred principle that
though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must
1994]
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To arrive at a clearer understanding of what is meant by
"equality," it will be useful to examine the various kinds of equality
first recognized and articulated by the Greek Philosophers,
Archytas, Plato and Aristotle.16 Because the very words and ideas
involved in democracy, politics, ethics and philosophy were first dis-
cussed and matured by the Greeks, "[t]here is nothing in Greek civi-
lization that does not illuminate our own." 17
This article will show that there is more than one kind of
equality. The Greek philosophers recognized that in addition to
simple arithmetic equality ("that which is the same and equal in
number or dimension),18 there is also geometric equality (when the
first stands in the same relation to the second as the second to the
third).19 Arithmetic equality is at work when equal rights are ac-
be reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal laws must
protect, and to violate would be oppression." Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., Jeffersonian
Democracy, in THE READERS COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY 593, 594 (Eric Foner
& John A. Garraty eds., 1991). That Thomas Jefferson was elected by a small group
of white, and frequently slave-owning, males in no way diminishes the force of his
comments. Nor does there seem to be any logical justification to allow women and
blacks now to enjoy some, but not all, of the rights previously enjoyed by the limited
group of 'original' citizens. If we now apply the term 'citizen' to a wider group of
people, this enlargement does not argue for a diminution in the rights and privileges
associated with the term citizenship; nor does it argue for a restriction of those
rights only to those originally labelled 'citizen.'
16. ARCHrAs, DK 47 B 2; PLATO, LAws 756c-758a; ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1301b29-
1302a8. (All classical references cited in this article are cited numerically according
to Chicago Manual of Style. The CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE §§ 15.298-15.304 (14th
ed. 1993). The typeface for each of these references, however will remain consistent
with the Bluebook. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION § 2.2 (15th ed.
1991)). Justification can be found for such an inquiry by the fact that these are the
philosophers whose political philosophy has formed the basis of subsequent modern
political philosophy and whose culture has provided the ethos of our society. The
Framers of the Constitution were also familiar with these philosophers and their
political thought. NEVINS & COMMAGER, supra note 14, at 107. Similarly, Jefferson's
political thought had its roots in the Enlightenment. Cunningham, supra note 15, at
593.
17. WILL DURANT, THE LIFE OF GREECE vii (1966). "Excepting machinery, there
is hardly anything secular in our culture that does not come from Greece. Schools,
gymnasiums, arithmetic, geometry, history, rhetoric, physics, biology, anatomy, hy-
giene, therapy, cosmetics, poetry, music, tragedy, comedy, philosophy, theology, ag-
nosticism, skepticism, stoicism, epicureanism, ethics, politics, idealism,
philanthropy, cynicism, tyranny, plutocracy, democracy: these are all Greek words
for cultural forms . . . matured for good or evil by the abounding energy of the
Greeks." Id.
18. Arithmetic equality appears at first glance to be perfect equality, for each
number in a sequence (12,10,8,6,4,2) stands at equal distance from each other. Thus
in a democracy, each person will have equal rights, e.g. one person, one vote. See
infra notes 200-230 and accompanying text.
19. Geometric equality appears at first to have done away with equality. The
numbers no longer stand at equal distance (64,32,16,8,4,2) with the result that each
person might appear not to have equal rights. A closer examination, however, shows
that the ratio between the numbers remains constant (so 4 is twice 2; 8 twice 4; 16
twice 8). Thus there is perfect equality. See id.
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corded to everyone; geometric equality is employed to treat different
groups differently to remedy past injustices, or to account for their
differing positions. More importantly, it will be demonstrated that
just as the Greeks recognized that both were necessary in any polit-
ical system, so too it must be understood that both are necessary for
a proper understanding and application of the Equal Protection
Clause.
I will argue that application of only one type of equality -
either arithmetic or geometric - is, in fact, not satisfactory and
likely to result in an unstable political system. According to Aris-
totle, "for the constitution to be framed absolutely and entirely ac-
cording to either kind of equality is bad. And this is proved by
experience, for not one of the constitutions formed on such lines is
permanent."20 Arithmetic equality is really a superficial equality;
geometric equality is a more perfect and satisfactory equality. 2 '
Rather, it is necessary sometimes to employ arithmetic equality
and sometimes geometric equality.2 2
The notion of two kinds of equality is not foreign to American
jurisprudence, although it has not been explicitly discussed in those
terms. Indeed it will be argued that the Court's equal protection
analysis does, in fact, employ both kinds of equality. When gender
classifications bearing no substantial relationship to the benefits at
hand are struck down and all people are accorded equal benefits,
arithmetic equality is at work. When benign or remedial measures
are allowed to compensate those burdened by the effects of past dis-
crimination, geometric equality is at work. Rather than simply tol-
erating these benign measures (or arbitrarily applying identical
treatment where it yields unequal results) by virtue of some unde-
fined (or ill-defined) analysis, a recognition of the two types of
equality will yield a more consistent, and intellectually satisfactory,
approach to equal protection decisions - and a more satisfactory
result for those seeking full and fair opportunity to participate in
our democratic society.
20. 6 8i &n.tX ,r tvg9 ica' bca ipav xvr6aOat tiv trftnra abxov. oavEp6v 8 ?
ToO avopiavovTog, o{bEgta ),p gSwvto; &T &v Toio1TEv 7OroXve6V. AwsroTLE, POLI-
Tics 1302a3-5 (H. Rackham trans., 1967). The reason for this lack of permanence is,
of course, political strife (orciou) which results from inequality - more precisely,
from those seeking equality (%Xo; *p c6 toov Tlro v'E; onamrt&ovamv). Id. at
1301b29-30.
21. &6 &f T& piv &pt/9g'n i'oSTnT xpijaac, r& 5i T6 Ka?" ixbv. Id. at 1302a8-
9.
22. As the 4th century B.C. orator Isocrates observed, what contributed most to
the good government of the Athenian state was the recognition of the two kinds of
equality - "that which makes the same award to all alike and that which gives to
each man his due." AREOPAGITUs 21-22 (G. Norlin trans., 1980).
1994]
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Gender-Based Classifications, The Supreme Court's
Response to The Early Challenges
A. Pre-Twentieth Century Challenges
There was little concern for women in the minds of the origi-
nal framers of the Constitution. They were certainly not under-
stood to be included in the phrase "[A]ll men are created equal."2 3
Nor did the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment see that amend-
ment as a bar to classification by sex, age, economic or social sta-
tus. 24 Thus it is hardly surprising that the few gender-based
equality claims which were brought following the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment were unsuccessful. 25 In fact, the Supreme
23. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REv. 451
(1978) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Sex Equality]. Ginsburg quoted Thomas Jefferson:
"Were our state a pure democracy, there would still be excluded from our delibera-
tions . . .women, who, to prevent depravation of morals and ambiguity of issues,
should not mix promiscuously in gatherings of men." (quoting M. Gruberg, WOMEN
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 4 (1968)). It should be noted, however, that the English lan-
guage (like French and Latin) lacks a generic term (such as &v6pamoq). As a result,
the term for the male of the species has done service for both men and women. See
supra note 8 and infra note 24.
24. Ginsburg, Sex Equality, supra note 23, at 452. That racially based discrimi-
nation was what prompted the Fourteenth Amendment is a commonplace that need
not be repeated. That the terms of the amendment are more sweeping, and univer-
sal, and hence not limited by its own language to racial discrimination, must also be
remembered. See infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, those
who hoped to gain women's suffrage by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment (specifi-
cally section 2 which prohibits the denial or abridgment of the right to vote to "male
inhabitants") were sorely disappointed. MacKinnon, supra note 8, at 15A-4-5 n.12,
has noted that "Congressional repudiations" of any guarantee of women's suffrage
centered on section 2 and little considered whether section 1 granted equal protec-
tion to women in areas other than the vote, with the interesting, and paradoxical,
result that there is little direct repudiation of the idea that equal protection might
apply to women.
Beyond being denied the vote, at the time of the Civil War amendments women
also lacked the ability to enter into contracts, to maintain control of their own earn-
ings, to litigate or to hold property. The Fourteenth Amendment had no effect on
those disabilities. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and
Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 162 [hereinafter, Ginsburg,
Sexual Equality].
25. The unerring belief in the natural inferiority of women, so pervasive in 19th
century thought, is best summarized by the 1852 New York Herald editorial. "How
did woman first become subject to man as she now is all over the world? By her
nature, her sex, just as the negro is and always will be, to the end of time, inferior to
the white race, and, therefore, doomed to subjection; but happier than she would be
in any other condition, just because it is the law of her nature. The women them-
selves would not have this law reversed." in AILEEN KRADITOR, Up FROM THE PEDES-
TAL SELECTED WRITINGS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FEMINISM I 190 (1968).
While economic considerations (especially concern for jobs, fear of competition)
have been more prominent in 20th century discussions, the importance of this un-
derlying belief in women's inferiority should not be underestimated.
Of course, both the divine ordination of woman's status and economic concerns
have been explained as "benign preference." As Blackstone stated: "[Tihe disabili-
[Vol. 12:381
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Court refused to sustain any challenge to gender-based classifica-
tion under the Equal Protection Clause2 6 prior to Reed v. Reed27 in
1971.
In the late 1800s, one woman's denial of admission to the Illi-
nois bar solely because of her gender was not deemed an infringe-
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment's privileges and immunities
clause in Bradwell v. Illinois.28 Nor was denial of the right to vote
a denial of a woman's privileges and immunities, despite the recog-
nition that women qualified as persons and citizens for the pur-
poses of the Fourteenth Amendment.29
While neither the denial of admission to the bar nor the right
to vote is currently a barrier to women, the judicial viewpoint made
clear in Justice Bradley's concurrence in Bradwell is instructive:
The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which
belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant
to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent ca-
reer from that of her husband .... The paramount destiny and
mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules
of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of
things and cannot be based upon exceptional cases. 30
Exactly how the law of the Creator was revealed to Justice Bradley,
and those who have followed him, was never made explicit, as Jus-
tice Ginsburg has noted. 3 1 Unfortunately, such categorical as-
sumptions about women are not simply a remnant of an age gone
by.32
ties which the wife lies under are for the most part intended for her protection and
benefit: so great a favourite is the female sex of the laws of England." 1 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES 445 (3d. ed. 1768).
26. Ginsburg, Sex Equality, supra note 23, at 451. For a more complete discus-
sion of these earlier decisions, see id. at 451-58.
27. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The importance of Reed for the subsequent course of
gender-based challenges will become clear from the following review. See infra notes
51-55 and accompanying text. The pivotal role of then advocate Ginsburg in arguing
the cases which resulted in gender being recognized as "quasi-suspect" should not be
underestimated. A review of the cases will support this assertion. See supra note 3.
28. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
29. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
30. Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141.
31. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 CINC. L. REv. 1, 4
(1975) [hereinafter, Ginsburg, Gender]. See id. at n.18 for citations of modern judi-
cial expressions of the same sentiment, including Turner v. Dept. of Employment
Security, 43 U.S.L.W. 2356 (Utah, Feb. 4, 1970). In State v. Bearcub, 465 P.2d 252,
253 (Or. Ct. App. 1970), the Oregon Court of Appeals stated that "[tihe Creator took
care of classifying men and women differently, and if the legislature accepts these
differences ... we are not prepared to say that the classifications thus made were
without good reason."
32. For judicial expression of such ideas see infra notes 161-70 and accompany-




B. 20th Century Challenges
Twentieth century decisions to gender-based challenges, prior
to 1971,33 justified gender-classifications as "rational social legisla-
tion" because of the "need" to protect women as the weaker sex. In
Muller v. Oregon,3 4 the Court upheld the constitutionality of an Or-
egon statute limiting the number of hours (to ten per day) that a
woman could be employed in a laundry, factory, or manufacturing
plant. 35 Muller36 thus signaled "benign preference" as a theme jus-
tifying gender-based legislation, which appeared in thematic coun-
terpoint to divine ordination as justification for differential
treatment of women. Responsible for bearing the next generation,
but as the "weaker sex," women were viewed as needing the law's
protection. The willing acceptance of such "protective" legislation
for women stood in stark contrast to the denial of any parallel pro-
tection for men in Lochner,3 7 where the Court viewed such protec-
tive legislation as an unacceptable infringement of the individual's
freedom to contract.
Gender-based, protective, economic legislation persisted even
after Lochner was repudiated. 38 Why did gender-neutral, protec-
tive legislation not follow? Because "hours and other limitations
applicable to 'women only' operated to deny women access to better-
paying positions and promotions, thus protecting men's jobs from
33. In 1971, the United States Supreme Court, in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971), declared arbitrary legislative distinctions based on gender forbidden under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text for
discussion.
34. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
35. Id. at 422-23.
36. Muller is remarkable because of the latitude allowed to the state for legisla-
tion in the economic and social sphere, remarkable, of course, because of the Court's
decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) to strike down similar legisla-
tion limiting the hours (also to ten per day) for men and women in bakery
employment.
37. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner stands for the Court's
willingness to strike down any state social and economic legislation which it believed
to encroach on economic freedom. Finding no legitimate purpose for regulating labor
conditions in the absence of an actual health or safety concern, the Lochner Court
was above all concerned with protecting the laissez-faire approach to American free
enterprise.
38. The use of substantive due process in Lochner to invalidate state laws in this
area came to an end with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), where the Court
upheld the state's right to adopt whatever economic policy it deemed to promote the
public welfare. Id. at 537. See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTrru-
TIONAL LAw § 11.3, 363-64 (4th ed. 1991).
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women's competition."39 Indeed, Muller has been cited as a "road-
block to the full equality of women."40
Thus the actual motivation and effect of legislation would be
ignored so long as a "benign" purpose could be offered as "protective
wrapping"41 for the law. Gosaert v. Cleary42 clearly followed this
reasoning: the Court upheld a Michigan statute barring women
from the job of bartender unless they were the wives or daughters
of male bar owners. The "unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to
try to monopolize the calling" would be ignored so long as the be-
nign justification of "protecting" women was advanced.43
Similarly, the Warren Court, in Hoyt v. Florida,44 upheld a
Florida statute limiting jury duty solely to women who registered
voluntarily with the court. Women were treated advantageously, in
the Court's view, by such legislation in recognition of their place at
"the center of home and family life."45 No thought was given to the
rights of Hoyt, who, when denied access to a representative jury,
was convicted by an all-male jury of second-degree murder for kill-
ing her husband.46 Nor was there any recognition of the fact that
the majority of adult women were not engaged in full-time family
care.
47
39. Ginsburg, Gender, supra note 31, at 6. See id. at n.31 where Justice Gins-
burg cited contemporary literature critical of the result reached in Muller.
40. Ginsburg, Gender, supra note 31, at 5 (citing Murray, The Rights of Women,
in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 521, 525 (N. Dorsen ed., 1971)).
41. As Justice Ginsburg termed it. Ginsburg, Gender, supra note 31, at 7.
42. 335 U.S. 464 (1948). Michigan could validly legislate to exclude women from
the occupation of bartending because of the "grave social problems" female bartend-
ers might create or, conversely, from which they might need to be protected. What
problems could arise for a female bartender that did not already exist for female
waitresses in the same establishment (e.g. drunken men) are not immediately obvi-
ous. The chief difference between the two, once the protective wrapping was off, is
the obviously higher pay scale available to bartenders.
43. Id. at 467. Cf. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) which allowed a
greater number of years to females than males in the military before requiring re-
tirement (by the "up or out rule") because of women's decreased opportunity for pro-
motion due to the lack of possibility of combat. Realistically, this conferred no
benefit to women. With no possibility for severance pay, the additional years in the
military simply put women at a disadvantage once in the outside job market.
44. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
45. Id. at 62.
46. Ginsburg, Sex Equality, supra note 23, at 456. A jury comprised of at least
some women might have better appreciated the state of mind of a woman suffering
from long term abuse.
47. By the mid-twentieth century, according to the U.S. Department of Com-
merce's Current Population Reports ser. P-50, no. 54, Work Experience of the Popula-
tion in 1953, 2 (Aug. 4, 1954), the majority of adult women had either not entered or
had passed the years when full-time child care was required (cited by Ginsburg, Sex
Equality, supra note 23, at 456 n.25).
1994] 389
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Almost as prominent as "benign" or "protective" justifications
for gender-based classifications was a second explanation for the
different treatment women received: the Constitution was an empty
cupboard for sex-equality claims.48 Despite the fact that women
had been recognized as persons and citizens for Fourteenth Amend-
ment purposes as early as 1874,49 and despite the Nineteenth
Amendment enfranchising women in 1920, no refuge against gen-
der discrimination would be afforded to women by the Constitution
because of their initial exclusion by the Constitutional Framers.50
Is Gender A Suspect Classification: Reed and its Progeny
The break from the uniformly deferential treatment of all gen-
der-based classifications came not from the liberal Warren Court,
but, surprisingly, from the more conservative Burger Court, in an
opinion written by Chief Justice Warren Burger in Reed v. Reed
(1971).51
At issue were Idaho's intestate succession laws which man-
dated a preference to males over females within each established
statutory classification used in the selection of estate administra-
tors. Chief Justice Burger delivered the unanimous opinion holding
that where legislation "provides that different treatment be ac-
corded on the basis of their sex.., it thus establishes a classifica-
tion subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause."5 2
Clearly, this is a different equal protection analysis than the Court
had hitherto employed. 53
The Fourteenth Amendment does not deny States the power
to treat different classes of people differently. The Court declared,
however, that the Equal Protection Clause does deny "the power to
48. Ginsburg, Sex Equality, supra note 23, at 456-57.
49. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). See supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
50. "The contention that women should be on the jury is not based on the Consti-
tution, it is based on a changing view of the rights and responsibilities of women in
our public life, which has progressed in all phases of life, including jury duty, but has
achieved constitutional compulsion on the states only in the grant of franchise by the
nineteenth amendment." Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 290 (1947)(quoted in Gins-
burg, Sex Equality, supra note 23, at 456-57).
51. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
52. Id. at 75.
53. The Court, without elaboration, appeared to be saying that any legislative
classification based on gender was subject to scrutiny. Is this a tautology for the
statement that any legislation which is violative of the equal protection of the laws is
subject to scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?
Or, is the Court, in fact, saying implicitly that gender is a suspect classification so
that normal Equal Protection analysis must be conducted with greater judicial scru-
tiny than would otherwise be the case? See infra notes 58-65 and accompanying
text.
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legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a
statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unre-
lated to the objective of that statute."5 4 Mandatory preference for
either sex "merely" to reduce administrative hearings "is to make
the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ."55
Although it seemed to pose the question of whether gender
was a suspect classification, and thus subject to a strict standard of
judicial scrutiny, the Reed decision did not answer it. That question
was answered affirmatively, but by only four members of the Court,
in the following year. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 56 the Court inval-
idated a requirement that female members of the armed forces
prove the dependency of their spouses in order to obtain the same
quarters and benefits automatically granted to married males with-
out any proof of their spouses' dependency. The Frontiero appel-
lants urged the Court to find gender-based classifications - like
classifications based on race, alienage and national origin - to be
inherently suspect and thus subject to "close judicial scrutiny." The
Court found "at least implicit support"5 7 in Reed and noted that the
Reed Court's approach5 8 departed from "traditional" Equal Protec-
tion Clause analysis,5 9 a departure justified by the Nation's "long
and unfortunate history of sex discrimination."60
54. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971). The opinion then stated that the
classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." Id. (quoting Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
55. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
56. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Four justices concurred only in the judgment, one justice
dissented, while four justices joined in the opinion which declared gender a suspect
classification. Three of the concurring justices found it unnecessary, for the purpose
of the case, to characterize sex as a suspect classification "with all of the far-reaching
implications of such a holding." Id. at 692.
57. Id. at 682. The Frontiero Court noted that the Reed decision was unanimous.
Id.
58. "[D]ifferent treatment. . . on the basis of their sex ... thus establishes a
classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause." Reed, 404 U.S.
at 75 (1971).
59. Under traditional Equal Protection analysis, a legislative classification must
be sustained unless it is "patently arbitrary" and bears no rational relationship to a
legitimate governmental interest. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 683. Clearly by "tradi-
tional" rational basis Equal Protection analysis, the Reed Court should have upheld
the law, a reasonable measure to reduce workload, in the view of its proponents. It
was reasonable, moreover, to assume that "as a rule" men are more familiar with
business than are women. Instead, the Reed Court rejected the "apparently rational
explanation" and invalidated the law because it provided dissimilar treatment for
similarly situated men and women, making "arbitrary legislation" forbidden by the
Constitution. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 683-84 (1973) (citing Reed, 404 U.S. at 76).
60. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 683.
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Working with an attitude of "romantic paternalism," the Na-
tion's legislatures had, from the beginning, enacted statutes "laden
with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes"61 which im-
posed special disabilities upon women simply because of an "immu-
table characteristic determined solely by an accident of birth."62
The Frontiero Court found such disabilities not in accord with "the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility."6 3 Moreover, such stat-
utes and disabilities relegate an entire class to inferior legal status
without any regard to individual capability. 64 Gender should thus
be considered a suspect 65 classification because, like other suspect
criteria, gender "frequently bears no relation to ability [to] perform
or to contribute to society."66 No majority appeared in Frontiero,
however, to support a declaration of gender as a suspect class.67
Without majority support for gender as a suspect class, the
Court in Kahn v. Shevin68 was free, the following term, to uphold a
Florida property tax exemption provided to widows, but not to wid-
owers. Unlike Frontiero (where females were denied benefits
"solely for administrative convenience"), 69 the Court found the Flor-
ida law "reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushion-
ing the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which that
loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden."70
61. Id. at 684-85.
62. Id. at 686.
63. Id. (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175
(1972)).
64. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686-87. The Court also found support for gender as a
suspect classification in Congress's recognition that such classifications are "inher-
ently invidious," evidenced by its passage of legislation: Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964; the Equal Pay Act of 1963; and, the Equal Rights Amendment in 1972.
Id. at 687. The Court concluded that "this conclusion of a coequal branch of
[g]overnment is not without significance .... ." Id. at 687-88.
65. Classifications based on gender are inherently suspect and, therefore, subject
to strict judicial scrutiny. Where there is strict scrutiny, mere "administrative con-
venience" will not sustain the statute's constitutionality. Id. at 686-88.
66. Id. at 686.
67. Justice Powell's concurrence, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun, found it unnecessary to decide the issue "with all of the far-reaching im-
plications of such a holding." Id. at 691-92. Additional motivation, if any was
needed, to avoid reaching that question was supplied by the possible passage of the
Equal Rights Amendment and a desire to avoid assuming a legislative function. Jus-
tice Stewart's concurrence was based on the fact that the statute worked an "invidi-
ous discrimination." Id. at 691.
68. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
69. Id. at 355 (citing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690 (1973)).
70. Kahn, 416 U.S. at 355 (1974). "If the discrimination is founded upon a rea-
sonable distinction or difference in state policy" then a discrimination in favor of a
certain class will not be judged arbitrary and will be upheld. Id. (quoting Allied
Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1958)). Once again, "benign preference" serves
as a justification for gender-based discrimination in legislation.
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Justice White, however, in his dissent found the proffered "be-
nign preference" an inadequate justification for the statute.71 By
allowing a property tax exemption to all widows (who are thus all
presumptively needy), the State gave a benefit to even those rich
widows least in need of State largess, while denying it to needy
widowers. 72
Justices Brennan and Marshall's dissent reiterated the opin-
ion, expressed in Frontiero, that "gender-based status. . ., like clas-
sifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, must be
subjected to close judicial scrutiny, because it focuses upon gener-
ally immutable characteristics over which individuals have little or
no control." 73 Further, legislation favoring widows did not serve
an overriding or compelling interest that could not be achieved by
more narrowly tailored legislation and must, therefore, be
invalidated. 74
While the Court in Kahn v. Shevin found ample justification,
by "benign preference," to uphold a small tax advantage for widows,
it found no need to extend equal disability coverage to pregnant wo-
men, the same women, responsible for "bearing future generations,"
who were seen to need "preferential" legislation in Muller.75 Ap-
parently legislation could be upheld by reason of "benign prefer-
ence," but there was no corresponding obligation to examine all
legislation affecting women to see if it accorded with the doctrine of
"benign preference."
Indeed, the Court in Geduldig v. Aiell076 found the exclusion
of women disabled by normal pregnancy from disability coverage
under California's disability insurance program to be "rationally
supportable," and so refused to invalidate the law under the Equal
Protection Clause. 77 The Court found California's interest in mini-
71. Kahn, 416 U.S. 351, 360-62.
72. Justice White found administrative convenience (already found inadequate
in Frontiero) inadequate justification here since gender-based classifications were
"suspect." Greater justification than the presumption offered by the State (all wid-
ows are needy, all widowers are not) is thus necessary. Further, if the State proposed
to compensate females for the effects of past discrimination, then it should not have
limited the exemption solely to widows. Id. at 361. Similarly, if past discrimination
is the touchstone, then widowers who, as members of racial or ethnic groups had
similarly suffered, should also be compensated.
73. Id. at 357 [footnotes omitted]. The dissent also noted that gender-based clas-
sifications have often been used "to stereotype and stigmatize politically powerless
segments of society." Id.
74. Id. at 359-60.
75. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
76. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
77. Id. at 495 (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) to sup-
port the view that the State need not attack all aspects of a problem - or even the
problem itself - at one time).
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mizing the cost to participating employees and in keeping the pro-
gram self-supporting to be legitimate state interests. 78 Further,
the Court found that the exclusion worked discrimination against
"[no] definable group or class 79 in terms of the aggregate risk pro-
tection derived by that group or class from the program."8 0
The dissent found quite the opposite, that the statute singled
out women for less favorable treatment in a 'gender-linked disabil-
ity peculiar to women" while men received full compensation for all
disabilities suffered.S1 The dissent82 argued that such dissimilar
treatment of men and women based on physical characteristics
must necessarily constitute sex discrimination.83 Such differential
treatment8 4 would necessarily be invalidated under stricter judicial
scrutiny.
Despite the promise offered by Reed and Frontiero, no decision
definitively labelled gender-based classifications inherently sus-
Interestingly, by means of the same "rational basis" test which the Court used,
the District Court had invalidated the exclusion under the Equal Protection Clause
because "the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities is not based upon a classifi-
cation having a rational and substantial relationship to a legitimate state purpose."
78. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 495. It is not clear that the State demonstrated that
these goals were impossible, or even difficult, to meet if pregnancy related disabili-
ties were included. The State merely alleged greater cost. See the dissent's argu-
ment on this point, where the District Court's assessment of the impact is quoted.
Id. at 503-05. Despite admitting that inclusion of normal pregnancy-related disabili-
ties would be "substantial," the District Court found that these increased costs would
not destroy California's disability program. The costs could be accommodated by
"reasonable" changes in contribution rates, etc. Id. at 493-94.
79. The Court ignored the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment offers equal pro-
tection to the individual. Thus "aggregate" rights analysis is a disingenuous way to
justify such a plan. Cf. Developments in the Law, Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV.
1065, 1111 (1969) (describing the rights conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment as
individual rights, not group rights).
80. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496. Only by defining the two classes as pregnant and
nonpregnant people could the Court arrive at such a conclusion. Justice Stewart
concluded that "while it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not
follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classi-
fication." See id. at 496 n.20. The Court then went on to say that "there is no risk
from which men are protected and women are not." Id. at 496-97. Since men can
never be at risk of pregnancy, this does not seem to follow. The suitability of"aggre-
gate risk protection" to analysis made under the Equal Protection clause is doubtful.
See supra note 79.
81. Id. at 501. Thus men were covered for prostatectomies, circumcision, gout
and hemophilia - disabilities primarily, or exclusively, suffered by men.
82. Id. at 498 (Brennan, J. dissenting). Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall
argued that, beginning with Reed and Frontiero, the precedents established required
a stricter level of scrutiny.
83. Id. at 501.
84. Such differential treatment was justified solely because inclusion of preg-
nancy-related disabilities would be "too costly." Id. at 504. The dissent cited Memo-
rial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263 (1971), to assert that the State
"must do more than show that denying [benefits to the excluded class] . . . saves
money" when legislation is subject to strict scrutiny.
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pect. This allowed the Court to uphold both a law benefitting Flor-
ida widows as "benign" and a law denying benefits to working
women disabled by pregnancy8 5 as "rational." The most lenient ra-
tional basis analysis allowed both results. In neither of these cases
did the Court follow Reed or Frontiero in its analysis to ask if the
legislative distinctions were necessary. No prediction could be
made, on the basis of the four preceding cases, regarding the likely
outcome (or even what level of scrutiny the Court would employ) for
any equal protection challenge to a gender-based classification.
Hence, the decisions following 1974 are not consistent in their anal-
yses or results.
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,8 6 the Court invalidated a provi-
sion of the Social Security ActsV granting survivors benefits to wid-
ows with minor children,88 but denying benefits8 9 to surviving
widowers. Justice Brennan drew on Frontiero to assert that
"archaic and overbroad generalizations" negating the importance of
the female wage-earner's importance to the family were inconsis-
tent with the Constitution.90 The Court in Wiesenfeld found the
gender distinction irrational 9 ' and in no way justified by some gen-
eralized benign compensation for the economic difficulties exper-
ienced by women. 9 2 Applying, instead, a "functional approach,"93
the Court reasoned that the sex of the surviving parent was unre-
lated to the purpose of allowing the surviving parent to care for the
child,94 and thus the gender-based distinction was merely "gratui-
85. Thus, women disabled by pregnancy were denied disability benefits for which
they would have been eligible if disabled by any other disability.
86. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g).
88. Based on the earnings of the deceased husband/father. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
at 643.
89. Based on the earnings of the deceased wife/mother. Id.
90. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 643. Indeed the Social Security provision was found
more pernicious than that in question in Frontiero because Wiesenfeld was not even
allowed the opportunity to demonstrate that he qualified based on dependency. Id. at
645.
91. Id. at 651. The Court looked to the purpose of the Social Security provision -
to enable the surviving parent to care for the child at home - to find gender-based
differential treatment irrational.
92. Id. at 648. In contrast to Kahn v. Shevin, the Wiesenfeld Court rejected "the
mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose.. .[as) an automatic shield which
protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory
scheme." Id. at 648. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
93. The functional approach appears to look to the purpose of the legislation
while applying a heightened rational basis test. This heightened rational basis stan-
dard seems to be motivated by the presence of a gender-based classification and con-
cern regarding "archaic and overbroad generalizations." Id. at 652.
94. Id. Since the benefits were need based, a surviving father who worked in-
stead of caring for his children would not receive any benefits. Cf. Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), where the Court struck down, under the Due Process
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tous."9 5 Unfortunately, the "functional" approach did not provide
any stronger basis for future decisions.
Although the Wiesenfeld Court was unanimous, the Court
sharply divided when faced with an almost identical problem only
two years later. In Califano v. Goldfarb,96 the Court, by a narrow
margin (5-4), affirmed a District Court's ruling to strike down an
identical Social Security provision providing benefits to surviving
widows regardless of need, but only to surviving widowers upon
proof of dependency. 9 7 The majority found that a two-fold discrimi-
nation existed in the provision: not only did widows and widowers
receive different benefits but so too did female and male wage-earn-
ers.98 The Court declined to uphold differential treatment solely on
the basis of gender,9 9 despite the noncontractuallOO nature of the
Social Security provisions involved in both Wiesenfeld and Gold-
farb. Moreover, the Court reasoned that because there was an ab-
sence of deliberate Congressional intent to provide a "benign
preference" to widows, where the presumption that all widows are
dependent is based on archaic stereotypes,lOl and because the de-
Clause, the State's assumption that a father had presumptively no rights to the care
and custody of his children, with whom he had been living and whom he had sup-
ported, after the death of his common law wife.
95. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 653. Wiesenfeld provided the sole opportunity for
Justice Rehnquist to concur in an opinion striking down legislation under an equal
protection challenge. He did not reach the issue of gender-based discrimination but
simply concluded that the distinction did "not rationally serve any valid legislative
purpose" because it was irrational to distinguish between surviving mothers and fa-
thers who provided care for their children as the sole surviving parent. Id. at 655.
96. 430 U.S. 199 (1976).
97. Id. at 204. Widowers were defined as dependent if they had received at least
one half of their support from their deceased wives. Id. at 201. In other words, the
female wage earner must provide three-quarters of the family's income (all of her
own and half of her husband's). Cf. the Frontiero requirements discussed supra
notes 56-60. Justice Brennan regarded this gender-based distinction as "indistin-
guishable" from that decided in Wiesenfeld. Id. at 204.
98. Id. at 209. Despite paying in at the same rates as her male colleagues, Mrs.
Goldfarb received fewer benefits since her widowed husband received no benefits fol-
lowing her death. Thus the Court emphasized that the Social Security provision
worked to the disadvantage of widowers and female wage earners. Id.
99. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 211-12.
100. A "non-contractual" (i.e., no specific contract exists regarding return between
the Social Security payor/recipient and the Government) interest in future benefits
(such as Social Security) does not preclude an Equal Protection claim.
Rather, Wiesenfeld held that the fact that the interest is 'noncontrac-
tual' does not mean that 'a covered employee has no right whatever to
be treated equally with other employees as regards the benefits which
flow from his or her employment,' nor does it 'sanction differential pro-
tection for covered employees which is solely gender based.'
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 211-12 (citation omitted). Thus differentiation solely on the
basis of sex must not be made without sufficient justification.
101. Focusing on the discrimination against male widowers as the relevant issue,
Justice Stevens concluded that this discrimination was "merely the accidental by-
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sire for administrative convenience had already been rejected in
Frontiero and Reed, there was no basis to support gender-based dis-
crimination in employment related benefits. l0 2
The dissentlO3 argued against what it saw as the majority's
application of heightened scrutiny, to the field of social insurance
legislation.10 4 The dissent further justified as "benign preference"
legislation conferring a benefit on widows within the Social Security
system:' 0 5 a classification benefitting "aged widows... is scarcely
an invidious discrimination." 0 6
"Benign preference" is, once again, advanced as a justification
for legislation "favoring" women. More noteworthy is the dissent's
focus on the inapplicability of heightened scrutiny to the social in-
surance setting.'0 7 Why? Because the cost of extending benefits to
female members of the military in Frontiero was a mere pittance in
comparison to the estimated 500 million dollars annual cost of ex-
product of a traditional way of thinking about females." Id. at 223. He also rejected
"benign preference" as justification because while not "wholly irrational" the legisla-
tive history showed that "habit, rather than analysis or actual reflection" was re-
sponsible for equating the term widow with dependent. Id. at 219-22. He concluded
that "something more than accident is necessary to justify the disparate treatment of
persons who have as strong a claim to equal treatment as do similarly situated sur-
viving spouses." Id. at 223.
In trying to reconcile the apparent inconsistency between Kahn and Wiesenfeld,
Stevens preferred to follow the unanimous decision in Wiesenfeld. Id. at 224. See
also his discussion of Kahn and some 19th century presumptions about women's in-
feriority. Id.
102. Id. at 216-17 (stating that administrative convenience included not only the
time, but also money, saved by using presumptions instead of individual hearings).
103. Justice Rehnquist joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Blackmun.
104. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 225 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent distin-
guished Wiesenfeld by the terms of the Social Security provision flatly denying any
benefits to surviving widowers/parents regardless of any showing of need. In the in-
stant case, only a showing of dependency was required. The dissent further argued
that recent cases, which had declined to extend constitutional provisions into social
security legislation, were controlling (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975)
and Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976)). Noteworthy in Goldfarb is the dissent's
seeming acceptance of a heightened standard of scrutiny implicit in Reed and ex-
plicit in Frontiero, while merely restricting the applicability of such a standard in
the social security setting.
105. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 226 (1976). The dissent compared the Social Security
provision to the property tax exemption for widows only upheld in Kahn v. Shevin,
416 U.S. 351 (1974).
106. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 242. The dissent further argued that because a show-
ing of dependency is only required for widowers, not widows, the legislation was
overinclusive and, hence, not offensive to the Equal Protection Clause in social wel-
fare cases. Id. at 236.
107. Yet it should be noted that while in this case Justice Rehnquist seemed now
to accept the heightened scrutiny applied in Frontiero, he dissented there on the
basis of the deferential rational basis standard (referring to the District Court
Judge's opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 341 F. Supp. 201 (1972)). Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
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tending social security benefits to widowers in Goldfarb.1o8 More
striking is that the dissenters' seemed to accept, inferentially, that
heightened scrutiny was applicable in other settings.
What, one might ask, is the basis for the Goldfarb dissenters'
tacit recognition of the applicability of a heightened standard of
scrutiny to gender-based classifications in other areas? In 1976 the
Court, in Craig v. Boren;l0 9 enunciated a standard of heightened
judicial scrutiny, now known as the intermediate level of scrutiny.
The weighty issue before the Court which finally crystallized this
standard of review was nothing more nor less than an Oklahoma
provision which prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the
age of 21 years but permitted its sale to females over the age of 18.
In Craig v. Boren, the Court again began from Reed to affirm
that legislative distinctions between males and females are "subject
to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause."11o The Court then
announced that "[t]o withstand constitutional challenge, previous
cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives."11 How did the Court reach this
new standard? A review of the cases previously decided provided
the framework: mere administrative ease and convenience is no
longer found to be a "sufficiently important objective to justify gen-
der-based classifications." 1 12 Similarly, "archaic and overbroad"
generalizations regarding women no longer justify gender discrimi-
nation where gender is an "inaccurate proxy for other, more ger-
mane bases of classification."'1 3 Where there is a weak congruence
between gender and the trait which gender represents, either the
108. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign Classifications in the Con-
text of Sex, 10 CoNN. L. REv. 813, 821 (1978) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Some Thoughts].
109. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Craig was decided prior to Goldfarb in the 1976 Term.
110. Id. at 197 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971)).
111. Id. [emphasis added].
112. Id. at 198 (citing Reed, 404 U.S. 76-77 (1971); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498 (1975); and Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975)).
113. "Outdated misconceptions" about women's place in the home similarly can-
not support legislation based on their doubtful accuracy. Craig, 429 U.S. at 198-99.
Cf. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) where Utah's statutorily mandated
differential support of males and females (males to the age of 21 and females only to
the age of 18) was found to be "self-serving: if the female is not to be supported so
long as the male, she hardly can be expected to attend school as long as he does, and
bringing her education to an end earlier coincides with the role-typing society has
long imposed." Id. at 15.
Stanton seemed to recognize the possible existence of an intermediate standard:
the Utah legislation was struck down as failing all standards - compelling state
interest, rational basis or in-between. The Stanton Court did not articulate what the
"in-between" standard would be; that was left for Craig v. Boren.
[Vol. 12:381
TOWARDS A NEW EQUAL PROTECTION
legislation must be reformed along gender-neutral lines or actually
comport with reality, i.e., there must be significant empirical evi-
dence supporting differential treatment of men and women.l1 4
Although accepting highway safety as an important objective, the
Court concluded that the discrimination against 18 to 21 year-old
males was not substantially related to the legislative objective.115
If the Craig opinion appeared to set forth a definite and well-
established basis for applying a heightened level of scrutiny to gen-
der-based classifications, a perusal of the three major concurring
opinions in Craig (Powell, Stevens, Stewart and Blackmun) and the
114. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 199 (citing Cleveland Board of Education v. La-
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 650 (1974)). In LaFleur, the Court invalidated the mandatory
and overly restrictive maternity leave provisions (requiring unpaid leave for preg-
nant school teachers after the fifth month). LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 644. Although
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, the regulations were overturned by
the due process clause as creating an irrebuttable presumption of physical incapac-
ity in no way related to the individual's condition. Id. Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
Justice Powell would have invalidated the regulation under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, under which it was challenged, because the regulations were irrational.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 653. See also id. at n.2 where again Justice Powell did not
reach the question of gender as a suspect classification. However, he stated that the
classifications, whether gender or disability, "must at least rationally serve some
legitimate articulated or obvious state interest." Id. Here the regulations did not
serve the state's interest. This rational basis standard seems to fall somewhere be-
tween the Royster Guano and McGowan standards. See supra note 54 and accompa-
nying text and infra notes 130 and 143.
In LaFleur, Justice Rehnquist argued that "literally thousands of state statutes
create classifications permanent in duration, which are less than perfect, as all legis-
lative classifications are," LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 658 (quoting Chief Justice Burger's
dissent in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441). Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority's
preference for individualized determinations as a step backward from "a relatively
uniform body of rules enacted by a body exercising legislative authority" to an ad hoc
determination made by the "King's representative," where the legislative body alone,
represented "a significant step forward in the achievement of a civilized political
society."
Justice Rehnquist proceeded from the unsupported, and insupportable, assump-
tion that all ad hoc determinations are arbitrary and all legislative pronouncements
are not. Clearly this is the wrong distinction. The issue is not the size of the deci-
sion-making body (one or many), but whether the rule maker (one or many) is re-
sponsive to those being burdened by the legislation. This is the true distinction
between oligarchy and democracy, which are not simply definable by the number
involved in the process of governance. Working from this mistaken assumption,
Rehnquist viewed any challenge to legislative line-drawing as "an attack upon the
very action of lawmaking itself." Id. But see Justice Jackson's concurrence in Rail-
way Express, infra note 194-195 and accompanying text.
115. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 204-09. The slight statistical difference between
males and females was a 2.0 to 1.8 % arrest rate differential respectively for the age
group in question (18-21 year-olds) and so could hardly justify the use of gender as a
means of classification. Id. at 201. In sum, the principles embedded in the Equal
Protection Clause are not to be rendered inapplicable by statistically measured
loose-fitting generalities concerning the drinking tendencies of aggregate groups. Id.
at 208-09. But see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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two separate dissents (Burger and Rehnquist) casts doubt on any
such assumption. Justice Powell acknowledged that "the Court has
had difficulty in agreeing upon a standard of equal protection anal-
ysis that can be applied consistently to the wide variety of legisla-
tive classifications."116 He suggested that the Court's approach to
gender-based classifications was to apply a more critical examina-
tion than is normally applied when "'fundamental' constitutional
rights and 'suspect classes' are not present.""17 Powell concluded
that Iowa's gender-based classification failed, however, because it
did not bear a "fair and substantial relation" to the legislative objec-
tive, i.e., it failed a rational basis test. 118
Justice Stevens found Oklahoma's legislation denying 18 to 20
year-old males the right to purchase beer objectionable'1 9 because
it classified on the basis of an accident of birth.120 Although not
116. Id. at 210. See id. at n.24 for Powell's discussion. Despite dissatisfaction
with the Court's acknowledged two-tiered approach, (i.e. deferential rational basis
and strict scrutiny) he found support for it in precedent. Unhappy with the view of
the standard enunciated in Craig as a "middle-tier" approach, Powell stated "I would
not endorse that characterization and would not welcome further subdividing of
equal protection analysis." Id. Powell admitted that "candor compels the recogni-
tion that the relatively deferential 'rational basis' standard of review normally ap-
plied takes on a sharper focus when we address a gender-based classification." Id.
What standard does this yield? This vague standard is not a definitive "intermedi-
ate-level of scrutiny," at least not in the eyes of some members of the Court. At most
one can hope for is a rational basis analysis with a "sharper focus."
117. Id. at 210. Justice Powell's concurrence is illuminating to the observer trying
to ascertain just what standard of review the Court has been employing in gender-
based cases. Justice Powell too considered Reed the relevant precedent, but read that
case less broadly. Does this suggest that a broad reading of Reed leads to gender as
a suspect classification? Or, if Reed should be read less broadly, does this imply that
traditional deferential equal protection analysis, or something in between, is the ap-
propriate standard?
118. Id. at 211 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)
from which the standard of a "fair and substantial relation" is taken). Thus while
explicitly acknowledging a heightened level of scrutiny - more than that ordinarily
employed in nonsuspect classifications - Justice Powell would have the Court decide
the case on a pure rational basis standard.
119. "[N]ot as obnoxious as some the Court has condemned, nor as inoffensive as
some the Court has accepted." Id. at 212 (footnote omitted). Stevens admitted, that
"men as a general class have not been the victims of the kind of historic, pervasive
discrimination that has disadvantaged other groups," although he seemed to feel
that an exception might be made from that generalization for 18-20 year-old males.
Id. at 212 n.1.
120. This suggests that gender classifications in general should be treated as in-
herently suspect. Justice Stevens noted:
[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special dis-
abilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex
would seem to violate 'the basic concept of our system that legal bur-
dens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility.
Id. at n.2 (quoting from Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973), in turn
quoting from Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
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totally irrational, 12 1 "the unfairness of treating all 18-20 year-old
males as inferior to their female counterparts" did not justify the
law. Justice Stevens concluded that "there is only one Equal Pro-
tection Clause" which requires the State to govern impartially,1
22
and that the Court had not applied different standards of review in
different cases. 123 Yet, as the gender cases just reviewed indicate,
the Court has not applied the same standard in different cases, nor
have all of the Justices applied the same standard even within the
same case.
Justice Stewart saw the disparity in Craig as "total irrational-
ity,"1 2 4 recognizing that disparate treatment on the basis of gender
required some "colorably valid justification" to avoid
invalidation. 125
The dissents, separately expressed by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist, complete the gamut of possible views on
what standard the Court had, and should have, used for gender-
based classifications. Burger dissented from making gender classi-
fications not only suspect, but also "disfavored," arguing for a level
of constitutional classification that would not examine any claim of
gender discrimination.12 6 Under a rational basis standard, the law
should be upheld. 12 7 Like Burger, Rehnquist simply applied "ra-
tional basis" equal protection analysis,128 as defined by the stan-
dard set forth in McGowan v. Maryland: "The constitutional
safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." 129 By
the application of the McGowan standard, Justice Rehnquist effec-
tively eviscerated the Equal Protection Clause as a potential safe-
guard against arbitrary and discriminatory legislation: some state
121. By traditional Equal Protection analysis this conclusion should result in the
law being upheld. Any hope that a single standard could clarify what reasoning the
Court has followed in these cases was effectively dissipated by Stevens' examination
of the issue.
122. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 211.
123. Id. at 211-12. The enunciation of a single standard for all Equal Protection
analysis would seem highly desirable - at least for the sake of consistency. However,
Justice Stevens viewed the two-tiered analysis not as a "completely logical method of
deciding cases," but rather as a way to explain past "decisions that actually apply a
single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion." Id. at 212. Indeed, this concur-
rence seems remarkably oracular in terms of its clarity.
124. Id. at 215.
125. Id. Whether this means a higher standard of scrutiny or simply not the most
deferential rational basis standard is not clear.
126. Id. at 217 (Burger, J., dissenting).
127. Burger noted that eight members of the Court had found the law "not irra-
tional," hence there was no basis for invalidating it. Id.
128. Id. at 221-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961)).
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of facts can always be conjured up to justify arbitrary and unneces-
sary legislation.13 0
Craig v. Boren, the opinion, the concurrences and the dissents,
highlights the equal protection problem: not only is there no agree-
ment on whether gender classifications are inherently suspect, but
those professing to make use of the rational basis test are, in fact,
using two different standards: the standard of extreme deference
enunciated in McGowan 13 x and the more exacting standard set
forth in Reed 1 32 which requires a "fair and substantial relation" be-
tween legislation and its objective.
A review of the equal protection cases shows that the Court
has failed to developed a well-accepted and consistent approach to
gender-based classifications. Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan,133 a challenge to a women-only nursing school, confirms
this. While the intermediate level of scrutiny is likely to be used,
its acceptance is anything but universal.
In Hogan, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, stated that
Reed firmly established gender-discriminatory classifications as
subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.' 34 Further,
the Court placed the burden on those seeking to uphold legislation
which discriminates on the basis of gender135 and established that
the governing standard for such legislation was that set forth in
Craig v. Boren.13 6 The need to determine whether there is a "requi-
site direct, substantial relationship between objective and
means,"137 requires "reasoned analysis," not "the mechanical appli-
cation of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the
proper role of men and women." 138 Justice O'Connor's commitment
to the intermediate standard was clear:
130. The McGowan standard not only requires complete irrelevance before al-
lowing the law to be overturned, but further presumes that the legislature has acted
constitutionally despite any resultant inequality. Where any state of facts reason-
ably may be conceived to justify legislation, it survives Equal Protection scrutiny.
Thus the likelihood of any challenged statute being invalidated is slim. Maryland v.
McGowan, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
131. See supra note 130 and infra note 143 and accompanying text for discussion
of the deferential rational basis standard. See infra note 178 for a discussion of the
most deferential rational basis standard.
132. The Reed standard is taken from Royster Guano. See supra note 54. See
supra note 114 for the Royster Guano standard in LaFleur and supra note 118 and
accompanying text for the standard in Craig.
133. 458 U.S. 718 (1981).
134. Id. at 723.
135. Id. at 724.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 725.
138. Id. at 726.
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[W]hen a classification expressly discriminates on the basis of
gender, the analysis and level of scrutiny applied to determine
the validity of the classification do not vary simply because the
objective appears acceptable to individual Members of the
Court. While the validity and importance of the objective may
affect the outcome of the analysis, the analysis itself does not
change. 139
Justice O'Connor's opinion is undercut by four dissenters, an
indication of just how sharply divided the Court remains on the is-
sue of the appropriate standard for gender-based classifications.
Justice Blackmun's dissent displayed a lack of commitment to the
intermediate level of scrutiny: "it is easy to go too far with rigid
rules in this area of claimed sex discrimination, and to lose - indeed
destroy - values that mean much to some people .... "140 Justice
Powell,14 t another dissenter, viewed this case as presenting no "se-
rious equal protection claim of sex discrimination."14
2
Clearly these opinions do not comprise a coherent whole. De-
pending on the appeal of the facts of the case, support is sometimes
marshalled to follow Reed, Frontiero, and Craig and thereby subject
gender classifications to heightened scrutiny;143 at other times,
139. Id. at 724 n.9. Were Justice O'Connor's sentiments those of the entire Court,
not simply a majority for this one case, then those seeking to challenge legislation
under the Equal Protection Clause could take heart. Given, however, the variability
of the response of the other members of the Court, and the very ad hoc nature of the
Court's decisions, as this article has shown, there is ample room for concern.
140. Id. at 734 [emphasis added].
141. Id. at 735 (Powell, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 742. According to Justice Powell, the anomaly resulting in this case
revealed "legal error - that of applying a heightened equal protection standard, de-
veloped in cases of genuine sexual stereotyping, to a narrowly utilized state classifi-
cation that provides an additional choice for women. Moreover, . . . [this] system
should be upheld in this case even if this inappropriate method of analysis is ap-
plied." Id. at 736. Again, "benign preference" obscures the fact that by restricting
male access to nursing programs what results is a profession chiefly restricted to
women, a "pink-collar ghetto," i.e., underpaid and under-respected precisely because
it is dominated by women.
143. In Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1974), although finding it unnecessary to
decide whether gender classifications are inherently suspect, the Court found Reed
to establish a presumption of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause and then
used the Royster Guano equal protection standard to strike down a statutory distinc-
tion where male child support is granted up to the age of 21 but female child support
is permitted only until the age of 18. Id. at 13-14 (citing 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
Such a distinction, which the Court found "self-serving" and coincident with role-
typing imposed by society failed all tests - "compelling state interest, rational basis,
or [anything] in between." Id. at 15, 17.
The Court reformed the Social Security Act governing AFDC payments to unem-
ployed fathers so that payments would be made whether the father or mother was
unemployed in Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1978). The Court ruled that while
Congress may deal with any problem incrementally, it may not do so along gender
lines where the result is the exclusion of families headed by unemployed mothers
and a denial of their subsistence benefits. Id. at 89.
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wholly deferential rational basis analysis is used to uphold the leg-
islation. 144 More disturbing is the frequent theme145 running
Working from the standard set forth in Craig ("classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives"), the Court in Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313
(1977), upheld Social Security provisions designed to benefit women by allowing
them to eliminate a greater number of low-earning years than men for the calcula-
tion of the benefits to be received. The Court found the discernible purpose of re-
dressing "society's longstanding disparate treatment of women" adequate
justification. Id. at 317.
Citing Webster, the Court in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1978), applied the inter-
mediate level of scrutiny to invalidate an Alabama statutory system requiring only
husbands, but not wives, to pay alimony. Arguing that even if gender were a reliable
proxy for need and even if marriage as an institution discriminated against women
(so that the statute would be serving a remedial need), there was no need to use
gender as a proxy for need because individualized hearings were already being held.
Id. at 281. "Where, as here, the State's compensatory and ameliorative purposes are
as well served by a gender-neutral classification as one that gender classifies and
therefore carries with it the baggage of sexual stereotypes, the State cannot be per-
mitted to classify on the basis of sex." Id. at 283. While ameliorative legislation in
the computation of Social Security benefits is upheld in Webster, a gender-neutral
need-based analysis is preferred in Orr in the context of individualized divorce
hearings.
In Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1979), following Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268 (1979), and Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979), the Court applied an
intermediate standard of scrutiny to invalidate the denial of workers compensation
benefits to the surviving widower of a deceased female wage earner. The Court relied
heavily on both Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), and Califano v. Gold-
farb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), but did so in conjunction with the intermediate level of
scrutiny, not simply by applying precedent. In addition to using the intermediate
test, the Court further shifted the burden of proof to those who would uphold dis-
criminatory legislation: a justification more persuasive than which the 1925 legisla-
ture used, namely, widows are more needy than men, was necessary. Wengler, 446
U.S. at 151. The Court then invalidated the law because there was no justification
for disparate treatment of similarly situated spouses, not because it worked as invid-
ious discrimination by discounting the importance of a female wage earner's benefits
to her surviving family. Id. at 148-49.
144. In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the Court upheld the
exclusion of women from coverage for disability due to pregnancy in a disability plan,
citing Geduldig v. Aiello for support. (The opinion borrowed heavily from Geduldig
to find no discrimination by virtue of aggregate risk protection.) Citing GE's long-
standing practice of downgrading the role of women in the labor force, the dissent
objected to the total loss of income suffered by women disabled due to pregnancy. Id.
at 147-50. GE's past employment practices, recognized as a motivating factor by the
District Court, were cited as further evidence by the dissent. Thus the dissent de-
scribed the Court's opinion as "simplistic and misleading." Id. at 152. Justice Ste-
vens criticized the characterization (pregnant vs. nonpregnant persons) used by the
Court to arrive at its conclusion that the exclusion did not constitute gender-based
discrimination. Rather, he argued, the distinction should be between those who face
the risk of pregnancy and those who do not: because only women have the capacity to
become pregnant, exclusion of pregnancy related disability is discrimination on ac-
count of sex. Id. at 155, 161-62.
Justice Ginsburg has suggested that the able pregnant woman seeking only to
do a day's work is a more sympathetic figure to the Court, viz. LaFleur. Sex Equal-
ity, supra note 23, at 462. See also supra note 114. The woman disabled by preg-
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throughout the successful challenges that the significant discrimi-
nation requiring invalidation is against men, not women.146
Given that the issue of whether gender is an inherently sus-
pect classification remains unanswered, 147 and given the very ad
hoc nature of the precedent with quite variable results due to the
appeal of the facts,148 there is ample reason to reconsider again the
arguments for gender as a suspect classification.
Gender Based Classifications: The Problem
What justification is there for revisiting the question of sus-
pect status for gender classifications, beyond the desire for a coher-
ent body of doctrinal precedent for equal protection challenges?
One goal which could be accomplished by such a reexamination
would be better guidance for the lower courts in place of the Court's
current ad hoc and inconsistent approach to gender classifications.
Another would be to restore a sense of legitimacy to the Court's de-
cision-making process. Both are arguments for a definitive - and
affirmative - declaration that gender is a suspect classification.
nancy is considered suspect (i.e. is she malingering so she can stay at home "where
she belongs"?). Justice Ginsburg also suggested that the reason for Aiello's (and Gil-
bert's) lack of success is the tacit assumption by the Supreme Court that childbirth
marks the commencement by the woman of her primary role as mother-wife. In this
role she should be supported by her husband, not her employer or the state. That
Aiello worked by necessity was irrelevant to the Court. Ginsburg, Gender, supra
note 31, at 42.
145. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 154-55 (1979)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
146. See, e.g., Wiesenfeld, Goldfarb, Craig, and Orr where men are granted bene-
fits formerly reserved for women. It would seem that the Court is most comfortable
striking down legislation that is, in fact, less favorable to men than legislation dis-
criminating against women. Less able to comprehend the discriminatory nature of
legislation impinging only on women, i.e. disability due to pregnancy (e.g. Geduldig,
GE v. Gilbert) or the difficulties of pregnancy and the lack of access to, or funding for,
abortion (e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977),
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977)) (a discussion of the abortion funding cases is
outside the scope of this article), the Court has upheld legislation severely restricting
the autonomy of adult women while regarding it as not in the least problematic.
147. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9 (1981).
148. What is most distressing is not the fact-specific nature of the decision making
but rather the fact that equal treatment for 18-21 year-old beer drinking males and
benefits for widowers is likely to receive a much warmer reception than 1) women
employees seeking disability benefits to support themselves when disabled by preg-
nancy; or, 2) equal access to government funding for medical procedures like abor-
tion, both of which have a qualitatively and quantitatively greater impact on the
economic and social well-being of women than beer-drinking does for young males.
Moreover, the substantive basis of the Fourteenth Amendment, and its role as a very
important safeguard protecting equal opportunity for full participation as citizens, is
somehow demeaned by the narrow, and often unimportant, issues to which alone the
Court seems comfortable applying it.
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Without a clear standard, consistent and coherent decisions having
any sense of legitimacy are impossible.
Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia149 is a case in
point. Had gender been ranked as a suspect class, as Justice Gins-
burg noted, Vorchheimer would have overturned a ruling allowing
for 'separate but equal' schools for scholastically superior boys and
girls. 150 Instead, the Supreme Court affirmed. As the trial judge in
Vorchheimer described it, the lower courts are left with "an uncom-
fortable feeling, somewhat similar to a man playing a shell game
who is not absolutely sure there is a pea."'151 Given the "uneven,
insecure, and... sharply divided opinions,"152 the question of how
any given case will be decided remains open.
Justice Stevens recognized the result of this uneven treat-
ment. To the question of when does disadvantageous treatment of
pregnant or formerly pregnant women constitute unlawful sex dis-
crimination (after LaFleur, Aiello, Gilbert and Nashville Gas 153), he
replied that while the answer should be "always," it appeared in
1976 to be "never" and is now [1977] clearly "sometimes."'154
Absent a declaration of suspect status, the Court is free to ap-
ply standards ranging from the most deferential rational basis to
an intermediate level of scrutiny. The results are obvious: under a
149. 400 F. Supp. 326 (E.D.Pa.1975), rev'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3rd Cir.1976) affd by an
equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977). The Court, in a non-decision (4-4 split),
affirmed the lower court's judgment for the School district which had argued that the
'separate but equal" doctrine in effect in Philadelphia (where the oldest school for
scholastically superior children was reserved for boys) was nonstigmatic. Contrary
to this view is that of Christopher Jencks and David Reisman, who see the reserva-
tion of any institution for males only as an "unwitting device for preserving tacit
assumptions of male superiority." CHRISTOPHER JENCKS & DAVID REIISMAN, THE ACA-
DEMIC REVOLUTION, 297-98 (1968)(quoted by Ginsburg, Sex Equality, supra note 23,
at 473-74).
150. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1976 Term, 217,
221 in CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA (Ronald KL. Collins, ed., 1980)
[hereinafter, Ginsburg, 1976 Term]. For those who think this type of segregation no
longer exists, Chief Justice Rehnquist's recent decision to grant a stay to the Citadel,
a male-only state supported military college, preventing the registration of Shannon
Faulkner (originally granted admission which was then denied upon discovery of her
gender) serves as one more reminder of just how far we have yet to go before reach-
ing gender equity. Woman Registers at Citadel, Then is Barred, N.Y. TIMES, January
13, 1994, at A8.
151. Vorchheimer, 400 F. Supp. at 341-42.
152. Ginsburg, Sexual Equality, supra note 24, at 171.
153. 434 U.S. 136 (1977). Nashville Gas's practice of eliminating a woman's accu-
mulated job seniority once she was forced to take a leave of absence due to pregnancy
related disability was invalidated by Title VII. Id. Interesting here was the Court's
decision that the exclusion of pregnancy from disability coverage was valid, while
the loss of her seniority, which effectively precluded a return to work in many cases,
was not.
154. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, From No Rights, to Half Rights, to Confusing Rights, 7
HUM. R. 12, 14 (1978)(quoting Nashville Gas, 98 S.Ct. at 357).
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deferential rational basis test almost any interest addressed by the
legislature is legitimate.155 But the question must be raised
whether the validation of any piece of legislation, solely because of
some conceivable set of facts, is appropriate when considering legis-
lation burdening those not adequately represented by the decision-
making body. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg has argued that an impor-
tant result of labelling gender as suspect and subjecting gender-
based classifications to strict scrutiny is to reverse the presumption
of constitutional validity.
"Absent this starting point [of suspect classification], the legis-
lative product would come to the court shored up by 'one of the first
principles of constitutional adjudication' - the basic presumption of
the constitutional validity of a duly enacted state or federal law."15 6
Heightened judicial review, resulting from a reversal of the pre-
sumption of legislative validity, is the necessary first step to allow
equal constitutional protection to those groups which are outside
the very narrow group actually represented in the legislative
process.
Is the Court's failure to apply a heightened, and single (strict),
standard prompted by jurisprudential restraint?157 Or is the Four-
teenth Amendment simply an inappropriate basis from which to ar-
gue for the legal equality of both men and women, due to its origins
in the years following the Civil War which should be viewed largely,
or exclusively, as an effort to remedy the plight of African-Ameri-
cans?158 Or, does the Court's variable approach to gender issues
result from a judiciary comprised chiefly, almost exclusively, of
men' 59 who do not grasp the implications of gender-based discrimi-
155. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender-Based Discrimination and the Equal Rights
Amendment, 74 F.R.D. 298, 327 (Panel Presentation at the 1976 Second Circuit Ju-
dicial Conference).
156. Ginsburg, Gender, supra note 31, at 17.
157. As Justice Ginsburg remarked, "the majority of the justices have avoided ar-
ticulating any standard of review for gender-based line drawing from the rationality
measure. Rather, the tendency has been to deal with each case in its narrow frame,
to write an opinion for that case and that day alone." Women as Full Members of the
Club: An Evolving American Ideal, 6 HuM. R. 1, 5 (1977) [hereinafter, Ginsburg,
Full Members]. In this view, the Court's decisions are comprehensible as an effort
not to transgress into the legislative arena; to rule only within the narrow confines of
the facts presented. A close reading of the opinions, concurrences and dissents pre-
cludes accepting such an explanation, as my review has shown.
158. Id. at 2. See supra note 24 and infra note 182 for a discussion of the suffrag-
ists' reaction to the Fourteenth Amendment.
159. Currently, women hold only 13.4 percent (or only 199) of the nearly 1500
federal judgeships. Harvey Berkman, High Court Trails Circuit in Appointing Wo-
men to Bench, Cmi. LAw., May, 1993, at 3. Specifically, that means that only 15
percent (or 24) of the Circuit judges, 11.5 percent (or 65) of the District judges, 13.7
percent (or 40) of the Bankruptcy judges, 18.2 percent (or 63) of the full-time Magis-
trates and only 5.8 percent (or 7) of the part-time Magistrates are women. [These
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nation as an impediment to women's opportunity to participate
fully in the political, social and economic life of the American com-
munity?160 Further evidence for this last explanation can be found
by an examination of University of California Regents v. Bakke.161
Bakke best illustrates the Court's confusion on the actual im-
pact of gender-based classifications and the comparability of race
and gender classifications. Those supporting a remedial race-based
quota system for admission to University of California, Davis Medi-
cal School urged that such a program be subjected to the less exact-
ing scrutiny applicable to gender-based classifications. Judging the
comparison between race and gender as inapposite Justice Powell
stated that:
Gender-based distinctions are less likely to create the analyti-
cal and practical problems present in preferential programs
premised on racial or ethnic criteria. With respect to gender
there are only two possible classifications. The incidence of the
burdens imposed by preferential classifications is clear. There
are no rival groups which can claim that they, too, are entitled
to preferential treatment. Classwide questions as to the group
suffering previous injury and groups which fairly can be bur-
dened are relatively manageable for reviewing courts. The reso-
lution of these same questions in the context of racial and
ethnic preferences presents far more complex and intractable
problems than gender-based classifications. More importantly,
the perception of racial classifications as inherently odious
stems from a lengthy and tragic history that gender-based clas-
sifications do not share. In sum, the Court has never viewed
such classifications as inherently suspect or as comparable to
racial or ethnic classifications for the purpose of equal protec-
tion analysis.162
Did Justice Powell mean that because gender classifications
are inherently less odious than racial or ethnic classifications, com-
pensatory legislation for women is less problematic? Justice Gins-
statistics were obtained from the Administrative Office of the Courts.] This is an
increase from the 1-2 percent rate characteristic of the 1960s, or 4 percent in the
1970s. Beverly Blair Cook, Women Judges: The End of Tokenism, in WOMEN IN THE
CouaTs 84, (Winifred L. Hepperle & Laura Crites eds. (1978)). But it hardly reflects
the increased number of women (40%) in law schools. See also The Role and Status
of Women Jurists: Country-by-Country Summary, GuILD PRAc. 35 (Winter, 1980).
160. Contrast the change resulting from women now holding approximately 20
percent of state legislative seats. Women bring a "consistently more liberal and fem-
inist perspective," according to a recent report issued by the Center for the American
Woman and Politics at Rutgers University. Women's legislative agenda is more
human-oriented and demonstrates a willingness to undertake the difficult problems
of health care, aging, families and education. Women in Politics: A Different Public
Policy Perspective, STAR Tm. (MINNEmPOLis) Jan. 14, 1994, at A16.
161. 438 U.S. 265 (1977).
162. Id. at 302-03 (citations omitted).
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burg suggested 163 two possibilities for these remarks, both of which
yield anomalous results, and are "less than crystal clear."16 4 Does
this statement suggest that preferential treatment for women is
less susceptible to challenge than preferential treatment for
blacks?165 Or, does this mean that official discrimination against
women is tolerated to a greater extent than similar discrimination
against traditional suspect classes such as racial and ethnic
groups?16 6 Or, worse, both?
"Preferential" laws denying women equal opportunities have
never been regarded as on a par with "back of the bus" treatment
accorded African-Americans.' 6 7 Indeed, discriminatory legislation
was thought to favor the "fairer and weaker sex," to place women on
a pedestal. But as the Supreme Court of California noted in Sail'er
Inn:l6 8
Laws which disable women from full participation in the polit-
ical, business and economic arenas are often characterized as
"protective" and beneficial. Those same laws applied to racial
or ethnic minorities would readily be recognized as invidious
and impermissible. The pedestal upon which women have been
placed has all too often, upon closer inspection, been revealed
as a cage.16 9
With no "suspect" label and tied to no particular standard, the
Court, when presented with a gender-based classification, will
sometimes uphold "benign" legislation; it will sometimes strike
down discriminatory legislation, if the price tag is not too high; it
will sometimes uphold legislation with strongly adverse conse-
quences for women. In contrast, by reason of suspect status, dis-
criminatory racial and ethnic classifications have been struck down.
By the same token, laws based on racial or ethnic classifications
163. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Bakke Decision, 65 WoMEN's LAW. J. 11, 14 (1979)
[hereinafter, Ginsburg, Bakke]; see also Ginsburg, Sexual Equality, supra note 24, at
170.
164. Ginsburg, Bakke, supra note 163, at 14; Ginsburg, Sexual Equality, supra
note 24, at 170.
165. Comparing the result in Bakke with Kahn v. Shevin, Schlesinger v. Ballard,
Califano v. Webster, one could answer this question affirmatively.
166. Given the whole range of pregnancy-related cases, this too could be answered
affirmatively. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
167. But this comparison is not helpful, for it obscures the consequences of the
laws' treatment of women. Discriminatory legislation which is capable of being la-
beled as 'benign' is surely no easier - indeed, it is often harder - to eradicate than
blatant and offensive discrimination, by virtue of that inaccurate label. See infra
note 173.
168. 485 P.2d 529, 541 (1971).
169. Id. The Sail'er Court concluded that gender classifications are thus properly
treated as suspect. The language quoted is taken almost verbatim by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
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which might remedy the long record of discriminatory treatment
suffered by these groups have also been struck down.
We are thus left with the question, then, if there are any ad-
vantages to gender being labelled a suspect class. Conversely, one
might also ask whether the remedial legislation upheld in the area
of gender, presumably because it lacks the label 'suspect' might
have anything to offer racial or ethnic minorities seeking to over-
come the effects of a long history of discrimination. 170 Clearly the
paradigm'?X developed by the Court is unsatisfactory for any
number of reasons, not the least of which is the lack of opportunity
for full participation afforded to women and minorities.
Gender as a Suspect Class
Justice Ginsburg has argued for gender as suspect because "it
is presumptively impermissible to distinguish on the basis of con-
genital and unalterable traits of birth over which the individual has
no control and for which he or she should not be penalized."17 2
Both sex and race provide an "unalterable identifying trait which
the dominant culture views as a badge of inferiority justifying dis-
170. Justice Brennan's dissent in Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. 265,
358-59 (1977), suggested just that. Brennan argued that, in fact, considerations de-
veloped in gender classifications might be applied to certain racial classifications.
Id. Where remedial goals are furthered by racial classifications, such classifications
should be allowed if they serve "important governmental objectives" and are "sub-
stantially related to the achievement of those objectives" (quoting Califano v. Web-
ster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977), which in turn quotes Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 (1976)).
So too Justice Ginsburg interpreted Webster to stand for a "rule of equal treat-
ment" which allowed genuinely compensatory measures, to be achieved by gender
classification where there is a genuine remedial purpose "tailored in scope and time
to match the remedial end." Ginsburg, Sexual Equality, supra note 24, at 169-70.
171. The chiastic paradigm developed is as follows:
GENDER RACE
Not suspect Suspect
Intermediate (?) standard Uniform standard/Strict scrutiny
Remedial measures No remedial measures linked to race.
The real anomaly resulting from this arrangement is that race, a suspect classifica-
tion by virtue of the invidious discrimination suffered, automatically leads to the
highest standard of judicial review (strict scrutiny) which in turn eliminates any
possibility for racially based remedial measures, necessary because of the past invid-
ious discrimination. Gender, on the other hand, which is not recognized as suspect,
because of the continued (mistaken) belief that such gender discrimination is really
"benign preference," can merit remedial treatment. Clearly something is wrong
here.
172. Briefs for Appellant, Reed, 15 and Frontiero, 27.
[Vol. 12:381
1994]' TOWARDS A NEW EQUAL PROTECTION 411
advantaged treatment in social, legal, economic and political
contexts."17 3
The justification for treating both race and gender as inher-
ently suspect classifications is best summarized by the following
passage:
The similarities between race and sex discrimination are in-
deed striking. Both classifications create large, natural classes,
membership in which is beyond the individual's control; both
are highly visible characteristics on which legislators have
found it easy to draw gross, stereotypical distinctions. Histori-
cally, the legal position of black slaves was justified by analogy
to the legal status of women. Both slaves and wives were once
subject to the all encompassing paternalistic power of the male
head of the house. Arguments justifying different treatment for
the sexes on the grounds of female inferiority, need for male
protection, and happiness in their assigned roles bear a striking
resemblance to the half-truths surrounding the myth of the
"happy slave." The historical patterns of race and sex discrimi-
nation have, in many instances, produced similar present day
results. 174
Why is suspect classification important? Because without that
recognition, the pervasive social, cultural and legal roots which
have helped to maintain gender discrimination will remain firmly
anchored; because women (and other groups accorded suspect sta-
tus) continue to be under-represented in policy-making bodies and
thereby lack the political power necessary to have a meaningful
voice in the legislative process (which is really the process of allo-
cating benefits and burdens). The presumed rationality of legisla-
tion, which may be appropriate where legislation concerns only
those whose interests are truly represented in the process, should
be viewed with greater suspicion where it affects those under-
173. Brief for Appellant, Reed 24-25. Yet the Bakke opinion discounts any similar-
ity between race and gender, perhaps because of an inability to recognize that so-
called preferential treatment accorded to women is, in fact, really similar to back-of-
the-bus treatment accorded to minorities; perhaps because women comprising a ma-
jority do not represent a "discrete and insular" minority, as the other suspect classes.
Yet this is to ignore the almost "total political silence" imposed on females well into
the 20th century, as Justice Ginsburg has noted. By virtue of not being an insular
minority, women have lacked the opportunity to develop that type of political power
and identity which their status and numbers might suggest. Ginsburg, Full Mem-
bers, supra note 157, at 4. This is not to suggest, however, that all discrete minorities
have developed into groups of political power, only that by virtue of being "discrete"
they have the potential to do so which women, spread out over wide geographic area
and socio-economic strata, have not.
174. Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional
Amendment? 84 HARv. L. REV. 1499, 1507-08 (1971)(footnotes omitted)(quoted by
Ruth Bader Ginsburg in Reed, Brief for Appellant, 15-16).
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represented in the process. 175 Above all, by recognizing gender as a
suspect classification the Court would be giving support to the idea
that women are full persons within the meaning of the
Constitution.17 6
What argument can be offered to those who assert that the
Fourteenth Amendment provides no basis for gender equality? As
Justice Ginsburg has argued, is not "equality of rights under the
law for all persons, male or female, ... so basic to democracy, and
its commitment to the ultimate value of the individual that it must
be reflected in the fundamental law of the land"?177
The Fourteenth Amendment, What Does it Guarantee?
A. The Scope of the Amendment
Does the Fourteenth Amendment offer any constitutional
guarantees? A product of the years following the Civil War, was it
intended solely to help newly freed slaves achieve the rights of citi-
zenship still denied them?178 Or, is there a substantive basis for
175. "M[W]omen are sparsely represented in legislative and policy-making cham-
bers and lack political power to remedy the discriminatory treatment they are ac-
corded." Reed, Brief for Appellant, 6. If there is any doubt about the lack of
adequate representation of issues of concern to, or relating to, women, some recent
comments made can serve as stark reminders. When breast cancer first achieved
sufficient political recognition in 1988 to merit Congressional concern, a female lob-
byist sought a Congressional sponsor to introduce language in a larger health care
bill to allow Medicare coverage for mammograms. Typical of Congressional atti-
tudes, the Congressman initially approached to act as sponsor responded "I did the
women's thing last year .... The guys will think I'm soft on women." The lobbyist's
reply: "Fear not. Just tell them you're a breast man." Susan Ferraro, The Anguished
Politics of Breast Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug, 15, 1993 (Magazine) at 61. If we are now
seeing some increased legislative concern for issues such as breast cancer, it is per-
haps due to the personal experiences of some members of Congress whose family
members have been affected. Clearly full legislative representation is a distant goal
for these groups whose views are not adequately represented or considered, espe-
cially given the broad range of issues of concern to women and minorities. Equal
representation, surely, should not depend solely on heightened awareness among
legislators who have more rarely experienced misfortunes all too common for women
and minorities.
176. Reed, Brief for Appellant at 41, where it is argued that past Supreme Court
decisions have lent credence to the view that women are "less than full persons
within the meaning of the Constitution."
177. Frontiero, Brief for Appellant 19-20 quoting President's Commissions on the
Status of Women, AMEmCAN WOMEN 44-45 (1963).
178. For an exposition of this view, see Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1976). Rehnquist also offered there the most deferential
definition of the rational basis test: so long as a law is not "patently irrational" and
"mindless" it should be upheld. Id. at 786. Despite his insistence that the only area
of law to which the Equal Protection Clause can apply, classifications based on race,
Rehnquist admitted that there would be less cause for complaint if the Court had
developed a consistent body of doctrine. "If ... recognizing that those who drafted
and adopted this language had rather imprecise notions about what it meant, the
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the rights guaranteed to all persons and citizens by the very terms
of the Amendment that gives it great applicability?
Despite its anti-slavery origins, it can be argued that the
Equal Protection Clause, the most sweeping of the provisions con-
tained in the Fourteenth Amendment, was intended to impose upon
the states "a positive duty to supply protection to all persons in the
enjoyment of their natural and inalienable rights - especially life,
liberty, and property - and to do so equally."'17 9 In addition to re-
quiring administrative fairness, in fact, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment also included a requirement for equal laws: "The equal
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."' 8
0
The Amendment was written not with language specific to racial
discrimination (as was the Fifteenth Amendmentls'), which sug-
gests a level of breadth designed to accommodate constitutional
growth. 18 2
Court had evolved a body of doctrine which both was consistent and served some
arguably useful purpose, there would likewise be little cause for great dissatisfaction
with the existing state of the law." Id. at 777. A consistent and useful approach to
the Equal Protection Clause is exactly what I am arguing is both possible and
necessary.
179. Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949). The authors noted that the equal protection provision was
found in virtually all forms of the proposed amendment, and was, of all the provi-
sions of the Amendment, the "common meeting ground" of those who supported the
amendment. Id. at 341-42.
180. Id. at 342 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)). The im-
portance of this recognition of the broad ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment so soon
after its adoption can not be overstated. Both the quality of the legislation as well as
the quality of its administration are thus brought within the scope of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.
181. Compare the language of the Fifteenth Amendment ("The rights of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude") with that of
the Fourteenth Amendment ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States
... are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws") U.S. CONST., amends. XIV, XV.
182. See Karst, supra note 7, at 17, where he argued that the framers of the
Amendment declined to use the language of specific rights and groups precisely to
allow for the potential for growth.
That women were not able to marshall support for inclusion of language guaran-
teeing women's suffrage in the Fourteenth Amendment does not limit the impor-
tance of the breadth of the language. As Flexner noted: "[silavery and the condition
of the Negro had been a boiling national issue for thirty-five years [prior to the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment]; a war had been fought over it. No such inten-
sity of feeling existed yet regarding the status of women .... Opinion in Congress
and throughout the North was concerned with assuring the vote for the Negro; it was
relatively uninterested in how such a controversial measure would affect women."
ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE 148 (1975). For a discussion of the wo-
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The dynamic quality of the Equal Protection Clause has been
acknowledged by the Court.
Likewise, the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the
political theory of a particular era. In determining what lines
are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been con-
fined to historic notions of equality, any more than we have re-
stricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given
time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights.
Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes
of the Equal Protection Clause do change.1 8 3
B. The Substantive Core
Critically important in our constitutional framework for those
most likely to be outside of the decision-making process is the "sub-
stantive core" of the Fourteenth Amendment and especially the
Equal Protection Clause. That is, the "principle of equal citizen-
ship, which presumptively guarantees to each individual the right
to be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible,
and participating member."18 4 While equality may be value neu-
tral, this Amendment is not.185
The critical question to be asked is clear: have the individuals
burdened by any given legislation had any significant part in the
legislative process - hence the importance of the "suspect" classifi-
cation. Groups or individuals with access to the decision-making
process are likely to be treated fairly; those outside of that process,
i.e. historically women and minorities, are not. The legislative deci-
sions regarding poorly represented groups are more likely to be
men's suffrage movement and the passage of the Civil War Amendments, see id. at
145-58.
That the Fourteenth Amendment was prompted by concern for the rights of Af-
rican-Americans is not to be denied. That the plain meaning of the language is not
so limited must also not be denied.
183. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966)(citations omitted).
Were the Equal Protection Clause not dynamic, the result in Harper v. Va. Bd. of
Elections would have been to uphold a state poll tax (clearly discriminatory against
the poor and minorities) because it was founded on "some rational and otherwise
constitutionally permissible state policy," which is what Justice Black's dissent pro-
posed. Id. at 673-74. The majority cited, as support for its belief in the potential for
change inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment, the change from Plessy (separate
but equal is constitutionally permissible) to Brown (repudiating separate but equal).
There would be few proponents today, even among adherents of the most deferential
rational basis test, of upholding an infringement of such a fundamental right as the
right to vote by a poll tax.
184. Karst, supra note 7, at 4.
185. The failure to recognize this substantive principle, indeed the belief that the
Amendment lacks any substantive basis, Karst explained, is responsible for the
"substantive void" which has characterized the Court's decisions in this area. In his
words, "[slurely we are near the point of maximum incoherence of equal protection
doctrine." Karst, supra note 7, at 3.
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based on inaccurate stereotypes. In addition, the full impact of that
legislation is unlikely to be appreciated by the legislators making it
because they will never be subject to its burdens.186
In addition to requiring that organized society treat each indi-
vidual as someone worthy of respect, someone who belongs to the
community, the Equal Protection Clause requires that legislation
which burdens members of society and prevents their full participa-
tion be invalidated. For such legislation inexorably leads to legisla-
tion by stereotype, and stereotyping stigmatizes.' 8 7
Where society operates free of such stigma, citizens have a
strengthened sense of their own self worth, both as individuals and
as members of the community. This leads to the realization that
there is no inherent dichotomy between the rights of the individual
and the rights of the political and social community: participation
in the community is fully necessary for the development of the indi-
vidual; and the development of the individual is fully necessary for
the community.' 8 8
In essence, then, we are left with only one point of conflict:
should the Equal Protection Clause, and hence the opportunity for
full and meaningful participation in the community, be restricted
only to those for whom the Constitution was originally written?' 8 9
186. As Karst stated: "When the burden of the legislation falls most heavily on a
group that is likely to be the subject of the legislatures' systematic neglect, it is natu-
ral for the judicial scrutiny to be heightened." Karst, supra note 7, at 24-25 (citing
U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
Cf. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1281b38-1282al-23. Aristotle theorized that, contrary
to first impression, it is preferable to have the one using, rather than the maker,
judge the product. For the one who uses the house is a better judge than the maker;
the diner a better judge of the meal than the cook. So too those affected by legisla-
tion are better judges of its burdens and benefits than those who legislate but are
unaffected by the legislation.
187. "The essence of any stigma lies in the fact that the affected individual is re-
garded as unequal . . . ." Karst, supra note 7, at 6.
188. Id. at 9. This idea goes back to the Greeks, for whom political community
was essential to the very identity of the individual. "[I]t is clear that the city-state is
a natural growth, and that man [sic] is by nature a political animal. .. ." (bcroviC o)v
oi~v cavep6v bu r&v 0act hj i 6Xt; o-t. icai 6tL 6 &v0p so 0 uEt ioXiTucv epov.)
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1253a2-4. (H. Rackham trans., 1967). Because humans are
political creatures, they "consequently fulfill their natural potential and are happy
only by belonging to a political community. By participating in politics, they share
in the ongoing political debate over interest and justice, and make use of their dis-
tinctive capacity for reason and speech. Moreover, Aristotle does define citizenship
as political participation." MARY P. NICHOLS, CITIZENS AND STATESMEN, A STUDY OF
ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS, 3 (1991) (citing ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1253a1-18, 1274b31-
75b21). See also Wolfgang Kullmann, Man as a Political Animal in Aristotle, in A
COMPANION TO ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 94-117 (David Keyt & Fred Miller Jr. eds.
(1991)) [hereinafter, COMPANION].
189. For such is the result when a deferential rational basis standard is used by a
judiciary chiefly composed of propertied white males to review legislation crafted by
those for whom the Framers wrote the Constitution: propertied white males.
1994]
Law and Inequality
Or, should it not also provide full constitutional protection of the
substantive guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment - equal citi-
zenship'90 - to everyone who is now a person and citizen (includ-
ing women)?
A reading of the Equal Protection Clause in this manner
would not require the judiciary to perform a function in conflict
with the legislative branch.191 Attribution of purpose to legislation
is, in fact, part of the ordinary judicial process of statutory construc-
tion and interpretation in which the Court daily engages. 19 2 To re-
quire clear articulation of the reasons for legislation, in fact,
safeguards the legislative process and does not require the judiciary
to infringe on a coequal branch.193 Indeed, one could argue that
judicial refusal to examine legislation by presuming its validity and
imputing rational basis where there might be none favors legisla-
tive arbitrariness. As Justice Jackson stated in Railway Express
Agency Inc. v. New York:194
Invocation of the equal protection clause ... does not disable
any governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand.
It merely means that the prohibition or regulation must have a
broader impact. I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities,
states, and the Federal Government must exercise their powers
so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except upon
some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of
regulation. This equality is not mere abstract justice. The
framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget to-
day, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that
the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minor-
ity must be imposed generally .... Courts can take no better
measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that
laws be equal in operation...195
To give the Equal Protection Clause full force, it is not suffi-
cient that laws are gender neutral and allow no distinctions
(although this is the necessary starting point). Once the substan-
tive basis of the Equal Protection Clause is recognized, then it be-
comes clear that the simple application of "equal" laws, i.e.
190. Thus the impact of legislation on the full participation in society for those not
previously included in "We The People" would have to be considered.
191. What Justice Rehnquist called "an endless tinkering with legislative judg-
ment, a series of conclusions unsupported by any central guiding principle"? Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See supra note 178.
192. Developments in the Law of Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1116
(1969).
193. Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine in a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 43-45 (1972).
194. 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949).
195. Id.
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arithmetic equality, can not achieve the desired result.' 96 Where
such diverse groups as those for whom the Constitution was origi-
nally written and those groups excluded from initial representation
are involved, "equal" rights achieves quite disparate results. But
equality is not only arithmetic, it is also geometric.19 7 The very no-
tion of "equality" has long been recognized as being broad enough to
accommodate different, and competing, interests within the polit-
ical community. 198
Developed within the contexts of mathematics and music the-
ory, the notions of arithmetic and geometric equality were then ap-
plied by the Greeks (chiefly Archytas, Plato and Aristotle) to the
political sphere.19 9 It is my contention that recognition and use of
the two kinds of equality are not only useful, but necessary for a
coherent and consistent understanding and application of the
Equal Protection Clause. The remainder of this article will be de-
voted to a consideration of the two kinds of equality and their appli-
cability to the Equal Protection Clause.
Two Kinds of Equality
A critical and fundamental shift in thinking occurred in the
late 6th and 5th century B.C. in Athens which signalled the rise of
participatory democracy 2 00 and isonomia, equality of political
196. By "equal" arithmetic equality is usually meant, where each individual re-
ceives the same; where each number stands at an equal distance from its neighbors.
See supra note 18 and infra notes 199-229 and accompanying text for a full
discussion.
197. Geometric equality appears unequal at first because the numbers no longer
stand at the same distance to each other, and hence each does not have "equal"
rights. But because the ratio between the numbers is equal, the result is actually
perfect equality. See supra note 18 and infra notes 199-229 and accompanying text.
198. See infra notes 199-229 and accompanying text.
199. Given the Greeks preoccupation with the importance of the political commu-
nity to the individual's development, it is understandable that anything of use to
political theory would be applied there.
200. In c.510 B.C. Cleisthenes, by making the people his political partners, cre-
ated a "balanced form of government by giving all citizens equally the right to par-
ticipate in the political life of the state and by eliminating the political monopoly
which birth and wealth had enjoyed so far." MARTIN OsTwALD, NoMos AND THE BE-
GINNINGS OF ATHnEN A DEMOCRACY 154 (1969). Most striking was the slogan Cleis-
thenes used to win support for his reforms: isonomia, equality of political rights. See
OSTWALD (supra) for a complete discussion of nomos, thesmos and the development of
Athenian democracy.
The importance of this original shift, which essentially resulted in the applica-
tion of arithmetic equality - equal shares, equal rights - to Athenian government,
can not be overstated. By breaking away from the traditions which tied political
power to birth and wealth, participation by all citizens in the governance of their
city-state became possible. As the discussion which follows will demonstrate, how-
ever, this first, essential critical shift was not sufficient. In Athens, because the prin-
ciple of equal shares, equal rights was carried out to its logical conclusion by means
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rights. 20 1 Isonomia thus comes to stand for democracy, rule by the
people (demos).202
Archytas of Tarentum 2 03 was the first to set forth the three
proportions, the three kinds of equality, in a work on music, 2 0 4 of
which the first two were applied to politics.205
of election by lot to magistracies, membership in the Boule (Council), etc., the prob-
lem was to find a philosophical justification for allowing greater participation by vir-
tue of qualification, hence geometric equality. In the United States, where there still
exists an extreme imbalance, directly related to wealth and birth, in the level of
participation possible (both in government and society as a whole), the problem is
reversed: finding a philosophical justification for a greater share for those lacking
the essentials (education, housing, jobs) necessary for greater participation in society
and the body politic. For an examination of the differences between Greek and
American citizenship, see Martin Ostwald, Shares and Rights: "Citizenship" Greek
Style and American Style, (forthcoming, in papers delivered at the 'DEMOCRACY 2500'
COLLOQUIUM in Washington, April 1993, to be published by the American School of
Classical Studies at Athens, summer 1994).
201. H.G. LIDDELL ET AL., GREEK-ENGLISH LExiCON (1969) (citing HERODOTUS
3.80). Significant, too, in the adoption of isonomia is the fundamental shift in think-
ing which it signals about laws, lawmaking and government.
Prior to Cleisthenes the usual word for law was thesmos (Ocag6;): "imposed upon
a people by a lawgiver legislating for it." OsTwALD, supra note 199, at 55. With
Cleisthenes, nomos (v6g±oc) is now adopted for "law." Nomos "looks upon a statute as
the expression of what the people as a whole regard as a valid and binding norm."
Id.
202. "The rule of the many, on the other hand, has, in the first place, the fairest of
names, equality before the law, and further it is free from all those outrages which a
king is wont to commit. There places are given by lot, the magistrate is answerable
for what he does, and measures rest with the community." HERODOTPUS 3.80.6. (G.
Rawlinson, trans., 1942). The thrust of isonomia is that the same rules apply to both
upper and lower classes: equality of the law. Martin Ostwald would now define it as
"equality of legislative and judicial rights." Letter from Martin Ostwald, Professor
Emeritus of Classics, Swarthmore College and University of Pennsylvania, (Feb. 11,
1994)(on file with author).
Equality of political rights in Athens meant far more than 1 person, 1 vote. It
meant that all citizens had equal opportunity to hold office (most offices were as-
signed by lot, although those requiring special qualifications were filled by election);
to participate in the Assembly, the decision-making body, to pass judgment on the
officials who were required to account for their magistracies before leaving office.
See also David Keyt, Aristotle's Theory of Distributive Justice, in COMPANION, supra
note 188, at 238, (summarizing political egalitarianism, where political authority or
that which is to be distributed is described as "the primary expression of democratic
justice.").
Yet even a democracy committed to the ideal of equal political rights and each
citizen having the same value as another recognized the need for both geometric and
arithmetic equality. Cf. THucYDIDEs 2.37.
203. Archytas lived in the early 4th century B.C., was of the Pythagorean school
of philosophy, and was highly regarded in antiquity, especially for his work in
mathematics.
204. Diels-Krantz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker 47 B 2 (=DK 47 B 2) (Berlin,
1951).
205. F.D. Harvey, supra note 1, at 101 (1965). I rely heavily on Harvey for his
treatment of the two equalities in Archytas, Plato and Aristotle, and make use of
Harvey's translations of Archytas's fragments. It is Harvey's premise that Archytas
was the first to set forth these concepts. His thesis finds support from Plato's Gor-
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There are three proportions in music: (i) the arithmetical, (ii)
the geometric, (iii) the subcontrary which they call the har-
monic. The arithmetical is when there are three terms which
stand in the following relation to one another in proportion: the
first exceeds the second by the same amount as the second ex-
ceeds the third (e.g. 6, 4, and 2, where 6-4 = 4-2) .... The
geometric is when the first stands in the same relation to the
second as the second to the third (e.g. 8, 4 and 2, where 8:4 ::
4:2). And of these the greater are in the same ratio as the
smaller (i.e. 8 is twice 4; and 4 is twice 2)."206
When applied to politics, the equality of arithmetical proportion is
really only superficial equality. While the numbers stand at equal
distance from each other, there is no account of the smaller ratio
between the numbers (4 is twice 2; 6 is 1 1/2 times 4; 8 is 1 1/3 times
6) as one progresses up the scale. Geometric proportion, however,
yields a true and satisfying equality, for the proportion between the
numbers is constant throughout (4 is twice 2; 8 is twice 4; 16 is
twice 8).207
According to Archytas, 20 8 the result of applying geometric pro-
portion (logismos) is to stop discord and dissent (stasis) and in-
crease harmony (homonoia). With geometric proportion there is
equality (isotes):20 9 "By this, then, the poor take from the powerful,
and the rich give to the needy, both sides trusting that through this
they will get t6 i'ov [equal share, equality]." 2 10
gias, where Plato introduces the idea of geometric equality "without a word of expla-
nation, as if it were already familiar." PLATO, GORGIAS 508a6 (E.R. Dodds ed.,
Oxford, 1959). I am indebted to Professor Martin Ostwald for referring me to these
works.
206. Harvey, supra note 1, at 103-04.
207. Harvey, supra note 1, at 104-05.
208. DK 47 B 3, supra note 1, at 105.
209. "Logismos when discovered stops stasis and increases homonoia; when it oc-
curs, there is no pleonexia, but there is isotes; for by this we settle our disputes."
(ocnav giv gnawaixv, 6g6votav & atroev ko'ytaoj6; bpOeio. cxove4fa 15 Yap oUK
gou ioiTov -Xvogivo-o icolio6mo; gonv- to-W y*p rmpi t cv aoiv)aXctcov
&aXXaoa6gs0a.) Harvey, supra note 1, at 105.
210. 6 i'oov also includes the notion of "fairness." Archytas noted further: "tilt is
a rule and it prevents men from doing wrong: it stops those who know how to calcu-
late before they do wrong, persuading them that they will not be able to escape no-
tice, when they come to it; and it prevents those who do not know from doing wrong,
showing by that fact (i.e. that they do not know how to calculate) that they are doing
wrong." Harvey, supra note 1, at 105.
For a description of the application of these ideas to Tarentum's constitution, see
ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 1320b9. In Tarentum, commercial property existed for the use
of the needy. Both lot, sortition, i.e. the lottery, (the ultimate expression of arithme-
tic equality) and election (geometric equality) were used for selecting officials. This
allowed full participation in most offices while reserving those with specialized func-
tions for people with the appropriate qualifications. Id.
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Plato2 11 understood that "to unequals[,] equals become une-
qual if they are not harmonized by measure .... For there are two
equalities (i.e. arithmetical and geometric proportion), which are
called by the same name, but are in reality in many ways almost
the opposite of one another."212 Plato described arithmetical equal-
ity as equality "of measure, weight, and number,"2 13 i.e. the lot.214
Arithmetic equality, because it does not differentiate between citi-
zens, can be applied by any state or legislator. Geometric equality,
however, "the truest and best form of equality, is not an easy thing
for every one to discern."215 Geometric equality gives in proportion
to the nature of each,216 resulting in the greatest good to both indi-
viduals and states:217 "Indeed, it is precisely this which constitutes
for us 'political justice,' which is the object we must strive for."218
Requiring greater statesmanship to be properly applied, geometric
proportion should not be applied exclusively. Without the anchor-
ing principle of arithmetic equality, one could argue alternatively
from geometric equality that only those most qualified should have
any share in government, in essence a reversion to a pre-democratic
government where political power was linked solely to birth and
wealth. Thus it is only through the conjunction of the belief in the
need for equality of citizens and the recognition .that equal things
given to unequals yields inequality that constitutional government,
true polity, is possible. Thus the application of both arithmetic and
geometric equality is necessary for any true constitution. 219
211. PLATo LAws 756e-757e. (B. Jowett trans., 1953) (quoted in Harvey, supra
note 1, at 108).
212. rotq -tp &viaotq t &iya &taa yyvot' v, hi 'nx &voi toO 3~pou .... Id. at
757a. Suotv *p ioorov oboaatv, 6jiwv jotv Aiv, 9p- 8i e toXX& axEo8v
ivavnfitv. Id. at 757b.
213. Aiv gly t' rrv ica egC Y(r i &pteWi. Id. at 757b.
214. The closest modern parallel is jury selection. In simplified form, election to
office by lot assumes that all citizens are equal in their ability and willingness to
fulfill basic civic functions. They are selected by a lottery, without regard to particu-
lar qualifications.
215. Tfiv 8 &Xi09cn(xTnv Kai cpct iv ia6krac oi')xi 4tov ,tavTC B5EiV. Id. at
757b.
216. pitpta &moiia np6; Tiv acraov ¢fv ba~p(p. Id. at 757c.
217. nt&v 8 6aov &v kapicoa n6XEatv i Kam itdyatq, ntcve &yEa &cnpgUm. Id.
at 757c.
218. PLATo, LAwS 757c (R.G. Bury trans., 1926). ou yup Sri iou )cai t6 noti.tlKOv
TU~tv ~5 &Eioi Oa ,tOc atov lcwOV* KM vAuv 11flc; 6pepivou0; 8d Kma 2tPO6 tarrjv TiJv
aotqrca. PATo, LAws 757c.
219. For practical application, see PLATo LAws 744b-c where geometric proportion
is used to allow those with greater property qualifications greater participation. It
should be noted that in Athens where everyone had equal opportunity to participate
by virtue of the lot, geometric proportion was necessary to counteract the presump-
tion that all were inherently equal for all purposes of governing. In the United
States this presumption is reversed: those who coincide with the original Framers of
the Constitution have had, and continue to have, control of the legislative bodies
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Aristotle, who discussed the two kinds of equality at the great-
est length, also understood the need for both arithmetic and geo-
metric equality.
All men grasp justice to some extent; but they only go part of
the way, and they do not state the whole of the absolutely just.
For example, justice is thought to be equality; and so it is, but
for equals, not for everybody. Inequality is also thought to be
just; and so it is, but for unequals, not for everybody. They omit
the "for whom" and judge badly. That is because they are judg-
ing themselves. Most men are bad judges in their own
cause.
2 20
Thus the issue of the two equalities is not simply a matter of distri-
bution of benefits and burdens in a political system, it is also a the-
ory about justice: everyone should be treated equally, unless there
are good grounds to justify a difference in treatment. 22 1 Rather
than implying an inequality between people, the two notions of
equality assume equality.2 22 The question then becomes one of dis-
covering what differences justify different treatment.
Justice is relative to persons and requires the same ratio for the
persons as for the things .... Men admit the equality of the
things but dispute that of the person. This is mainly because,
as just mentioned, they judge badly in their own affairs, but
also because each side is really saying something true about
justice and hence thinks it is saying the whole truth.223
Aristotle then discussed the most important issue: the purpose for
which the political community was formed. If it was formed solely
where the burdens and benefits of citizenship are allocated. Those previously ex-
cluded from participation remain outside of the majoritarian political process. Geo-
metric proportion is thus essential to ensure anything approaching equal
opportunity to participate because those excluded are laboring under the disability
of centuries of political silence and powerlessness.
220. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 1280a9-17 (R. Robinson, trans., 1962). ntavW4Tetp
anwovrat t&Kaiou v6, &U& g'xpt vtvoq npoEpxovTat, aci 4Xouotv oi R&v TO ICUpIGo
8tKzalov. otov BoKet t"ov To tKatov etvIa, Eai go-tv, &WX o' 0 o1 v &UX ot;o tcootq. iai
TO 5 10ov Soict 6fatov dvat, iccai yip ionv, &X' o 7t&v &X rotq &viootq- ot' &
ToT' cOaipoixcn, T6 ot;, icai iKpfvoi)m Kaic&4. r6 5'atuov 6Tt nepi mar i~v h EcpfGI;,
XFV ot' tcWtot oa Xot Kpvtcn nmpt rov otticov. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 1280a9-
17.
221. Harvey, supra note 1, at 114.
222. " 'Equality (or inequality) of the persons' is distressingly off the point: for this
suggests that the whole question is an empirical matter, whereas it is a decision
about procedure which rests on a moral belief about human rights." Id. Cf. KR.
Popper: "I hold, with Kant, that it must be the principle of all morality that no man
should consider himself more valuable than any other person. And I assert that this
principle is the only one acceptable, considering the notorious impossibility of judg-
ing oneself impartially." (quoted by Harvey, id. at 128).
223. ARISTOTLE, POLITCS, 1280a17-25. & bmi T6 fKatov uTaiv, icai Btlpqcat Tov
u.tv tp6ov &C'o ,,&v "a tVoV W o' Q;,ov icu-iia d Pytcu Epv 'c Tot; Id.
tv gEv ToI) ltpcitxTo; taroTnro ogLoko-p U)a, Tn'V 8& ottyC,4)g~taTTofXa, g~ara Oiv Sta
TO6 Xqeiv &pu, &6u Kpivo1)Ol Ta mtpt (XuTov Kaicw(, £ltelrc ica 8t 6IaT X&Jiv Pipt
Two; FK(ZTipau; &kcnv Tu v~ovatUO 8fKaov Xeitv &2tXk. id.
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for wealth or commercial purposes, then perhaps those with the
greatest property might have a claim to a greater stake. But be-
cause humans are political animals, they are driven to live together
even where they have no need of mutual assistance. Common in-
terest - the desire to share in the good life - brings them to-
gether. The good life - the opportunity for full participation as a
respected member of the community2 24 - is precisely what the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause promises, where
the state is governed with a view to common advantage for all.22 5
The converse of full participation is not simply lack of the good
life, but strife or revolution: "For party strife is everywhere due to
inequality, where classes that are unequal do not receive a share of
power in proportion ... for generally the motive for factious strife is
the desire for equality."22 6 It is here that Aristotle describes in de-
tail the two kinds of equality,227 arithmetic and geometric, the
means by which strife is avoided:
For the constitution to be framed absolutely and entirely ac-
cording to either kind of equality is bad. And this is proved by
experience, for not one of the constitutions formed on such lines
is permanent ... Hence the proper course is to employ arith-
224. The good life then is the chief aim of society, both collectively for all members
and individually. "[WIhen the multitude governs the state with a view to the com-
mon advantage, it is called by the name common to all the forms of constitution,
'constitutional government' [polity]." Id. at 1279a37-39. When government is
formed for this purpose, when it is deemed a "polity," it is considered by Aristotle to
be the best form of government. See NICHOLS, supra note 188 and accompanying
text.
225. 1278b23-25. giltma gtv o&v To3' 'ri)toq, aC icotvw &0 at Xoptq.
auvepxoVTat & Kai To fiv 9vEccv auto Ka. oavixoum ilv noktonuiv Kovowvav. Id.
The opportunity for full participation allows for the complete development of the
individual. Similarly, the political community achieves its full realization through
the development of its members. "It is precisely because the members of the multi-
tude have different contributions to make that they have a just claim to rule. Aris-
totle teaches democrats the value of heterogeneity to a defense of their claim to
political participation." NICHOLS, supra note 188, at 66.
226. ARISTOTLE POLITICS, 1301b27-29. xavmaXoO Yap 8& r6 vtaov 1 mtaaq, ou ghr
totq wvlaotq {ntxp;u &v&Io~ov ... 6Xo; 7sp 6 i'aov touvTE; aocwaioumv. Id.
227. "But equality is of two kinds, numerical [arithmetic] equality and equality
according to worth [geometric equality] - by numerically equal I mean that which is
the same and equal in number or dimension, by equal according to worth [geometric
equality] that which is equal by proportion; for instance numerically 3 exceeds 2 and
2 exceeds 1 by an equal amount, but by proportion 4 exceeds 2 and 2 exceeds 1
equally, since 2 and 1 are equal parts of 4 and 2, both being halves." ARISTOTLE,
POLITICS at 1301b29-36. (H. Rackham, trans., 1967) gon & 8trr6v T6 t'aov, t6 pv 7ap
& to T6 8i at' &4 cxv crrv - VW8 &pteg() Vi.v t6 nkit~it fl "IE)6Stra a t' oy,
xat' & fav & c6 t4) X6o. otov bxcpiXEt Kiat &ptOgo'v PEV taQ) tIC tpla totv Suotv Kai
ta6ta toi v6q, X6yq? & Tittapa totv 8uotv Kaia tcc -a toO Fv6;, ItOV yap IWpoq & 60
Tow Tttapo(v Kir t6 Cv tov 5uotv, &gojo *p Ri t.
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metical equality in some things and geometric equality in
others.22 8
To summarize, Aristotle saw political participation as natural
for humans who are, biologically, political animals. From the per-
spective of having surveyed approximately 150 developed constitu-
tions, Aristotle concluded that geometric equality combined with
arithmetic equality is best. Because the most stable political sys-
tems are those allowing the greatest number to participate, both
arithmetic and geometric equality are necessary. 2 29 Above all, for
the purpose of distributing the benefits and burdens within the
political constitution as well as for political justice, both arithmetic
and geometric equality must be employed together.23 0
From Archytas to Plato and subsequently to Aristotle, the first
two types of equality (arithmetic and geometric) were applied to
politics. In a political climate which gave rise to the first par-
ticipatory democracy, the importance of equality of citizenship
(arithmetic equality) cannot be overemphasized. But, as Archytas,
Plato and Aristotle all recognized, difficulties followed when only
one of the forms of equality characterized any form of constitution.
228. ARISTOTLE POLITIcs at 1302a3-9. I have substituted "arithmetic" for
Rackham's "numerical" in a desire for consistency and because Aristotle uses
arithemetike. Similarly, geometric is substituted for "according to worth." T6 &
&nkk ntvrg icao' Kactpav TFeTXac Alv tcr6TnTa oaXov. avEp6v 8' &i Tof
au3afvovToq- o& lgftux "p 6vtiio; EK rdov roto-kov X ,t Fov ... 816 &ci T& v V
&pt~irinic;6't Xpfiaeat, T& 8i I~ icat' k~(cv. Id.
229. The critical shift in Athenian, and Greek, political thought and government
was the recognition, from the time of Cleisthenes forward, that all citizens have an
equal stake and an equal right to participate in their governance: hence, the birth of
democracy with its basic premise that all citizens are equal (arithmetic equality).
Even as democracy was being practiced in a form truly demonstrative of the belief in
equality of citizenship, there was the recognition that differing needs and differing
abilities to contribute required something beyond pure arithmetic equality; hence,
geometric equality. With arithmetic and geometric equality both applied, govern-
ment could achieve the goal of equal citizenship while acknowledging reality.
It should be remembered that the recognition of the two kinds of equality was
not merely idle theoretical or philosophical musings for Archytas, Plato or Aristotle.
Rather it was an essential part of the discussion of how to implement the best polit-
ical system in an era when political participation was the ultimate good; where indi-
viduals were defined in terms of their connection with the city-state. It should be
remembered that Socrates' death is an extreme example of the latter. When faced
with a choice of exile or death, Socrates chose death. He could not imagine life sepa-
rate and distinct from Athens, his city-state. See PLATO'S APOLOGY.
230. The need for both kinds of equality allows for assimilation of a variety of
competing groups and people within the political community, something which is
only possible with the help of a statesman. "The activity of statesmanship reveals a
world that is not an ordered whole but rather is composed of dissimilar elements
that can come together - break apart in friendship and hostility... From Aristotle's
standpoint, however, the absence of an ordered whole is not simply a defect in nature
or the cosmos. It is nature's gift to humanity of the opportunity for statesmanship
and all that it entails." NICHOLS, supra note 188, at 11.
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Arithmetic equality is the hallmark of democracy: each citizen gets
equal shares. In geometric equality, each no longer stands in the
same position; rather each citizen receives his or her due. Thus
what at first appears to be true equality, namely arithmetic equal-
ity, although the essential beginning point for true democracy, re-
sults in inequality; when coupled with geometric equality, which
produces perfect equality, however, there can be true constitutional
government (polity).
Two Types of Equality and the Fourteenth Amendment
With a full exposition of the two kinds of equality, arithmetic
and geometric, and their importance to a stable and just political
system (in the views of Archytas, Plato and Aristotle) before us, it is
now time to turn to a consideration of whether and how these two
kinds of equality can properly be applied to the Fourteenth
Amendment.
For a constitutional provision whose substantive goal is equal
treatment under the laws for all citizens, both arithmetic and geo-
metric equality are necessary in turn. Where equal measures are
appropriate (for instance, one person, one vote) then simple arith-
metic equality will suffice - indeed, it is essential. In other words,
if gender, or other, classifications serve no useful purpose, or hinder
the full participation of that class burdened by differential treat-
ment, then neutral provisions are the most equal approach. Gender
neutrality is thus called for in the equal distribution of benefits (e.g,
Reed, Frontiero, Wiesenfeld, Goldfarb). Arithmetic equality -
equal measure, equal rights - is properly applied in the cases
where there is no valid reason for distinction.
Where opportunity for full and equal citizenship - "the right to
be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and
participating member" - is involved, but citizens stand in differing
positions, then geometric equality is necessary to ensure full access,
especially for those groups historically excluded from Constitu-
tional protection. So geometric equality was properly applied in up-
holding a Social Security provision allowing women to compensate
for their economic disadvantage in the workforce by eliminating a
greater number of low earning years.2 3 1 Similarly, a property tax
exemption for widows only could be seen as an example of geometric
equality. It seems more accurate, however, to argue that here such
231. E.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1973), where a Social Security provi-
sion allowing women to eliminate a greater number of lower earning years was up-
held as a means to redress society's longstanding disparate treatment of women in
employment. See supra note 143 for discussion.
[Vol. 12:381
TOWARDS A NEW EQUAL PROTECTION
differential treatment is misused, and arithmetic equality is to be
preferred. 232
A misapplication of arithmetic equality occurred in Bakke,
where the Court refused to recognize the need for an affirmative
action program to increase minority enrollment in medical schools
because "equal" treatment in fact yielded unequal results due to
the differing relative positions of those involved. However repug-
nant the idea of "quota" is to those who have not been historically
disadvantaged, the achievement of true equal opportunity requires
meaningful remedial measures in recognition of the actual position
of historically disadvantaged groups. By explicitly recognizing the
necessity for remedial measures, and tailoring them in a circum-
scribed way,2 3 3 such measures are likely to be much more effective
than generalized, unfocused and half-hearted attempts to make up
for past discrimination. While "color-blind" selection may be the
Court's goal, it can be argued from the preceding discussion of the
Greek philosophers (especially Aristotle with his comprehensive re-
view of Greek constitutions) that such a goal is both unattainable
and undesirable. The proper employment of both arithmetic and
geometric equality should be seen as the ultimate goal, and the ulti-
mate expression, of constitutional government.
The denial of disability coverage for a disability unique to wo-
men - pregnancy - resulted in neither arithmetic nor geometric
equality being properly applied. 234 Both arithmetic and geometric
equality would have achieved a more equitable result. Arithmetic
equality is called for where differential treatment for women (e.g.,
denial of disability benefits for pregnancy) results in preventing
their full participation in society. Geometric equality is necessary
where not to recognize women's reproductive capacity would simi-
larly limit women's participation (e.g., family leave). Penalizing
women for their reproductive capacity by providing no benefits au-
tomatically denies women equal opportunity for participation in the
economic, political and legal community.2 35
232. E.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1973). See supra notes 68-75 and accom-
panying text. Need based determination of benefits would not only achieve better
results, it would also avoid stigmatizing all widows (and women) as presumptively
needy. Further, those men in need would properly be accorded benefits.
233. See supra note 170 for Justice Ginsburg's comments on Webster.
234. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1973); GE v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
See supra notes 76-84, 144 and accompanying text.
235. See also Justice Marshall's opinion in California Federal Savings & Loan v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). For a discussion of the importance of recognizing wo-
men's biological differences, and the impact of the abortion-funding cases, see Sylvia
A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984). "A
political struggle that embraces recognition that men and women are both limited by
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Rather than a constitutional claim of last resort without sub-
stantive content, the terms of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment recognize the fundamental truths about
the need for participation in the body politic and the importance of
such participation for political stability. Moreover, recognition of
the two types of equality is inherent in the tradition of political phi-
losophy with which the Framers of the Constitution were familiar,
namely the Greek political philosophers.
Recognition of the two types of equality is essential for an un-
derstanding and implementation of the substantive basis of the
Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, such recognition would give
greater coherence to the heretofore inconsistent, erratic and ad hoc
body of judicial decisions which have so far comprised equal protec-
tion doctrine. Employment of both kinds of equality, essential for a
stable and just political system, would provide the very guiding
principle for equal protection analysis which those opposed to the
use of the Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause to
challenge arbitrary legislation have complained is lacking.. Indeed,
one could argue that the very incoherence and inconsistency which
has characterized equal protection analysis to date is attributable
to the Court's failure to recognize that there are two kinds of equal-
ity. Use of both types of equality and an acceptance of their legiti-
macy, for which the Greek philosophers provide considerable
support, would provide an intellectually and philosophically satisfy-
ing basis from which future decisions could be made.
Conclusion
This article examined the major equal protection challenges to
gender-based legislation. The judiciary has developed no clear, co-
herent body of precedent. Instead, the cases show an ad hoc and
variable method of analysis which is highly dependent on the emo-
tional appeal of the facts particular to the case. Challenges to re-
striction of complete benefits for men appears eminently more
comprehensible to the Court than challenges to significant impedi-
ments to women. Indeed, those cases challenging impediments to
women's full participation in the social and political community
have been met with an unbelievably naive assumption that such
differential treatment is "benign preference."
At best, the Court has shown equivocal commitment to the in-
termediate standard of scrutiny to gender-based classifications. It
is time now to reconsider the question of gender as a suspect class.
biology and able to transcend it may be stronger than one that ignores the core real-
ity of sex differences in relation to reproductive biology." Id. at 1039.
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Justice Ginsburg has been an eloquent advocate for such classifica-
tion. The argument, that an immutable characteristic stemming
from an accident at birth is in no way an appropriate basis for legis-
lative classification, is still a valid basis from which to argue for
gender as a suspect class.
The reversal of the presumption of validity, which otherwise
attaches to legislation, is the important achievement that would be
realized by labelling gender a suspect classification. No presump-
tion of legislative validity is appropriate where legislation ad-
versely affects women and minorities, too long underrepresented in
decision-making bodies. Critical judicial examination of the impact
of legislation affecting the full and equal participation of the com-
munity would serve as an effective guarantee against arbitrary
government.
A definitive declaration that gender is a suspect class is neces-
sary, but it is not sufficient. Rigid application of strict scrutiny to
racial classifications, necessary to eliminate discriminatory distinc-
tions, has allowed the judiciary to eliminate any possibility for
meaningful affirmative action, preserving the status quo as effec-
tively as the original discriminatory measures struck down.
Clearly, something beyond suspect classification is needed.
What has been lacking so far in equal protection analysis is an
understanding that there are two kinds of equality, arithmetic and
geometric. When equality is given to unequal things, the result will
be unequal, as Plato noted, unless due measure is applied. 236 For a
proper understanding and application of the Equal Protection
Clause, both kinds of equality are essential. As the Greek Philoso-
phers Archytas, Plato and Aristotle pointed out, both types of
equality are essential not only in distributing the benefits and bur-
dens of the political system, but also as the basis for true political
justice. Those political systems which failed to make use of both
kinds of equality are not only impermanent, but suffer discord.
The purpose of the political and social community is to offer
the possibility of the good life, as Aristotle explained, with govern-
ance directed to the mutual advantage of all. The application of two
kinds of equality to the Equal Protection Clause will allow fulfill-
ment of its promise - full and equal opportunity for participation
in the community. Those previously excluded will achieve greater
participation and personal development. But that is not the only
gain. By allowing greater participation and development for all, in-
dividuals and, collectively, the community as a whole will achieve a
greater level of development. Finally, by applying both types of
236. PLATo, LAws 757a. See supra notes 199-229 and accompanying text.
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equality in equal protection analysis, the good for which we should
strive, true justice, will be possible.
